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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AFTER FURMAN
In June, 1972, the Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia ruled "the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments." I This ruling was
the only point of agreement among the majority
Justices in this five to four decision. All nine Jus-
tices wrote separate opinions.2 What is the effect of
this decision, and what avenues are open to miti-
gate its impact?
Justices Brennan and Marshall were the only
members of the Furman majority to rule that the
imposition of capital punishment under all cir-
cumstances violates the eighth amendment.8
Both Justices adopted the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court previously in Trop v. Dulles:4 a
punishment is cruel and unusual if it violates the
dignity of man, as measured by evolving.standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.5 Brennan considered four factors in deter-
mining that capital punishment did not comport
with human dignity. Capital punishment is so
1408 U.S. 238 (1972). Three separate cases were con-
solidated for this appeal. Defendant Furman was con-
victed of murder committed during an armed robbery,
and sentenced to death. The Georgia supreme court
affirmed this conviction. Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga.
253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). Defendant Jackson raped a
woman while holding a pair of scissors to her throat.
His conviction and death sentence was affirmed by the
Georgia supreme court. Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga.
790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Defendant Branch was
found guilty and sentenced to death for the rape of a
woman during a robbery attempt. His conviction was
similarly affirmed. Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932
(Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
2Each dissenter joined in all dissenting opinions.
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." The eighth amendment
applies to the states. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962).
4356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
5408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at
329 (Marshall, J., concurring). The use of an evolving
standard to determine whether a punishment violated
the eighth amendment was first enunciated in Weems
v. United States: "What is cruel and unusual may ac-
quire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by humane justice." 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
severe as to be degrading to human dignity; 6 it is
arbitrarily inflicted;7 it offends contemporary
society;8 and it is excessive.' Justice Marshall
agreed that capital punishment violated human
dignity because it is excessive' and is unaccepta-
ble to contemporary society."
The remaining majority opinions ruled more
narrowly that the sentences of death in Furman
violated the eighth amendment.u These opinions
focused on the procedures under which the penalty
was imposed and the constitutional problems
created by those procedures," not the constitu-
'.408 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring). In com-
parison with all other punishments, death is uniquely
degrading to human dignity. Only death involves the
conscious infliction of physical suffering, in addition to
the psychological suffering which precedes its imposi-
tion. By its very nature, it is a denial of the prisoner's
humanity. Id. at 287-88.
7Id. at 274. Brennan employed statistics to show
that capital punishment is applied only in a trivial num-
ber of cases. When a punishment is inflicted so rarely,
the conclusion that it is being inflicted arbitrarily is
inescapable. Id. at 291-95.81d. at 277. Brennan inferred contemporary disap-
proval of capital punishment from the progressive de-
e in the imposition of the death penalty and the
current rarity of any executions. 1d. at 299.
9 Id. at 279. A punishment is considered excessive
when a less severe penalty would achieve the social and
penal purposes for which the punishment is inflicted.
Justice Brennan concluded that a lesser penalty could
achieve deterrence, retribution, and the protection of
society as effectively as death. Id. at 301-05.
101Id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Like
justice Brennan, Marshall defines excessive in terms of
whether a lesser penalty would achieve the purposes
that capital punishment is purported to acleve. Id.
at 342.
uId. at 369. While evidence of public opinion is in-
conclusive and contradictory, Justice Marshall declared
that if the average citizen was fully informed as to the
purposes of the penalty and its liabilities, he would find
the death penalty unacceptable. Id. at 361.
"2' do not at all intimate that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of
capital punishment that would comport with the
Eighth Amendment." 408 U.S. 238, 311 (White, J.,
concurring). "The constitutionality of capital punish-
ment in the abstract is not, however, before us in these
cases." 408 U.S. 238, 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1" The White opinion is specifically limited to a state
statute which authorizes but does not mandate the im-
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tionality of the death penalty itself. Justices
White and Stewart ruled that the death penalty
was excessive in the instant cases, and therefore
violated the eighth amendment. White ruled that
under a system which permits most capital of-
fenders to escape death, the penalty can have only
minimal deterrent or retributive effect.'4 Justice
Stewart also noted that lesser penalties were
authorized for these capital offenses,15 which indi-
cated that the legislatures believed death was ex-
cessive for these crimes. 6 Further, the rarity of
jury imposed death sentences evidenced that the
public considered the death penalty to be excessive
for capital crimes.' 7 Justice Douglas attacked a
system which allows the discriminatory imposi-
tion of death, claiming such discrimination vio-
lated the ban against cruel and unusual punish-
ments.5
The dissenters unanimously agreed that the
decision to abolish the death penalty was a matter
peculiarly suited for legislative rather than judicial
action. 19 Although admitting the eighth amend-
ment compels judicial review, they counseled
judicial non-involvment,'20 reasoning that it is a
legislative duty to determine appropriate penalties.
When the legislatures of forty-one states adopt the
death penalty for certain crimes, the Court should
defer to their judgment.2 Both Justices Burger
position of death for murder and rape, and where death
has been only infrequently imposed. Id. at 311.
14 Id. at 312. A lesser penalty would be just as effec-
tive in achieving retributive and deterrent aims.
15 Under Texas law, murder is punishable by death
or imprisonment over two years. TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 1257 (1925). The sentence for rape is death
or imprisonment of at least five years. Id. at art. 1189.
In Georgia, a convicted murderer faces death or life
imprisonment. GA. CoDE- ANN. § 26-1101 (1971). A
rapist faces death, life imprisonment, or a prison term
of 1-20 years. Id. at § 26-2001.
16408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
17 Id.
11 Id. at 257. Justices Stewart and White referred to
this phenomenon of discriminatory and arbitrary ap-
plication. "[Tihe petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence has
in fact been imposed. Id. at 309. "[Tjhere is no mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id.
at 313 (White, J., concurring).
19Id. at 432 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 410
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 418 (Powell, J., dis-
senting); Id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201d. at 384 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Id. at 433
(Powell, J., dissenting). The dissenters accepted the
validity of the evolving standards of decency test. See
note 5 supra. Id. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id.
at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 430 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
"Id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 410
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 432 (Powell, J., dis-
and Powell ruled there is insufficient proof that
capital punishment violates basic human dignity
to justify judicial abolition of capital punishment
in all cases."
The dissenting Justices also rejected the ma-
jority ruling that a punishment which is excessive
violates the eighth amendment. They asserted
the eighth amendment does not encompass an
inquiry into whether a punishment is excessive.3
Nevertheless, Justice Powell concluded that the
imposition of capital punishment for rape and
murder would not be excessive under all circum-
stances.
4
Similarly, the dissenters asserted that arbitrary,
infrequent, and discriminatory applications of
capital statutes do not fall within the proscription
against cruel and unusual punishments. 5 Chief
justice Burger concluded that no empirical data
reveals arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing
practices.2
6
Thus, in Furman only two Justices ruled that
capital punishment is unconstitutional under all
circumstances, a position specifically rejected by
three of the dissenters. The narrow holding of the
majority is that the imposition of capital punish-
ment under the procedures of the instant cases
violates the eighth amendment. The penalty is so
infrequently imposed that it is excessive and is
discriminatorily and arbitrarily applied. It is likely
that the dissenters will accept this holding as
precedent.2 The tendency of the Burger court has
senting). Chief Justice Burger stated that in a democ-
racy, it is the legislature which responds to changes in
public opinion and mirrors public opinion. Since forty-
one states have approved some form of capital punish-
ment, its acceptance by contemporary society may be
presumed. Id. at 384.
22Id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 431
(Powell, J., dissenting). Both Justices advocated placing
a heavy burden of proof on anyone attempting to prove
that capital punishment violates basic human dignity.
Legislative approval of capital punishment creates a
presumption of validity. Id. at 384. This presumption
is further strengthened by prior Supreme Court deci-
sions which support the constitutionality of the death
penalty. Id. at 380; Id. at 421-27 (Powell, J., dis-
senting).
2Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 451
(Powell, J., dissenting). Burger stated that earlier
Supreme Court decisions have considered excessiveness
only in terms of the disproportionality of the punish-
ment to the crime. Id. at 392-94. Further, this issue
involves questions of the validity of penal purposes,
and the effectiveness of punishments to achieve these
purposes. Burger declared these questions to be beyond
the scope of judicial inquiry. Id. at 396.
21 Id. at 456.
21 Id. at 397 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 399.
27Justice Harlan was a good example of a Justice
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been to follow the precedents of the Warren era.s
In an opinion written by justice Blackmun, the
Court overturned the Illinois capital punishment
statute, citing the Furman decision.29 Any future
capital statutes must correct those procedures
which allow the infrequent and discriminatory ap-
plication of capital punishment.
Reactions of State Courts and Legislatures
No lower court has yet ruled that any existing
state procedures comply with the standards estab-
lished in Furman. State courts have focused on
the existence of jury discretion to sentence a capital
offender to a lesser penalty.3 This focus is evident
in recent decisions of the Delaware and North
Carolina supreme courts.3 2 In Delaware, the pun-
ishment for first-degree murder is death.D Under a
separate statute, however, the jury can recommend
mercy, and the judge may then sentence the ac-
cused to life imprisonment.5 ' The Delaware su-
preme court struck down only the mercy statute:
death remains as the mandatory sentence for
murder in the first degree. 5 In North Carolina, the
punishment for rape is death, but the statute allows
the jury to recommend life imprisonment." The
North Carolina supreme court severed the mercy
section from the rest of the statute, ruling that in
light of Furman it violated the eighth amendment.
dissenting in one opinion, and subsequently accepting
the majority holding in later cases. See Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615-17 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 116 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring).
28 Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the
Burger Court, SuRm~E COuRT Fa~v. 265 (1971); Kal-
yen, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1970, 85 HAv.
L. REv. 3, 5 (1971).
29 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). All nine
judges agreed that the Illinois capital punishment
statute violated the standards established in Furman.
30 See Eaton v. Capps, 348 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala.
1972); State v. Speck, 52 Ill. 2d 284, 237 N.E.2d 699
(1972); Capler v. State, 268 So.2d 338 (Miss. 1972);
State v. Bellue, 193 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1972); Huggins v.
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 327,191 S.E.2d 734 (1972). See
also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
31 State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972);
Huggins v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 327,191 S.E.2d 734
1972).
32 State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972);
State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1972).
3 DEL. CODE Aim. tit. 11, § 571 (1953).
34 Id. at § 3901.
35 State v. Dickerson, __ Del. __ _ A.2d - (1972).
36 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1966). The jury recom-
mendation of mercy is binding on the trial judge.
3 State v. Waddell, __ N.C._, __ S.E.2d - (1972).
The court reasoned that the ability of the jury to de-
Death is now mandatory for rape in North Carol-
ina. Both courts have ruled that Furman demands
the elimination of discretion in sentencing in
capital cases.
The reactions in several state legislatures have
also been concerned primarily with the elimination
or restriction of the discretionary sentencing power.
Three states, linois,2 Indiana39 and Colorado0
have proposed mandatory death penalties for the
conviction of certain specified crimes. This ap-
proach eliminates any discretion to select between
death or imprisonment.
Florida has approved a new capital punishment
statute which seeks to restrict the amount of discre-
tion the jury and judge have, rather than eliminat-
ing it.-n The statute reduces the number of capital
crimes. 2 After a separate sentencing hearing, the
jury can only recommend death or imprisonment,
based on the existence of certain specified aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances.4 The judge, if
termine life or death violated the standards of Furman
v. Georgia.
3 The Illinois bill provides for mandatory death in
cases of murder of elected officials or candidates for
elected office; murder of policemen, firemen or prison
guards; murder of two or more individuals; murder
resulting from intentional destruction or disruption of
community facilities or contamination of food products;
killings resulting from airline or other hi-jackings; mur-
ders by contract; murders accompanying robberies, ag-
gravated kidnaping or arson. Chicago Daily News,
Dec. 12, 1972, at 15, col. 1.
39 The Indiana proposal would make death manda-
tory in the following cases: killing a police, fire or cor-
rections official; murder for hire; murder by detonation
of an explosive; assassination; murder by a person
previously convicted of first or second degree murder;
murder by a person under life sentence; murder com-
mitted in a rape, arson, robbery or burglary attempt by
a person previously convicted of any such offense;
murder committed during a kidnapping; murder during
the hi-jacking of any commercial vehicle. Chicago
Sun-Times, Apr. 20, 1973, at 11, col. 1.
10 The Colorado bill mandates death for felony mur-
der, and the murder by a prisoner of a guard, fellow
prisoner, hostage or bystander during an escape. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1972, at 14, col. 4.
41 See Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative
Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J.
Crmm. L. & C. 10 (1973), for an analysis of the new
Florida capital punishment statute.
2 The capital offenses are: Unlawful killing of a per-
son by an individual engaged in arson, robbery, rape,
burglary, kidnaping and air piracy; premeditated
murder; unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb; killing resulting from un-
lawful distribution of heroin by a person over 17, when
use of heroin is a proximate cause of death. Id. at 17.
4 The aggravating circumstances are limited as fol-
lows: (a) The capital felony was committed by a person
under sentence of imprisonment; (b) The defendant was
reviously convicted of another capital felony involving
e use or threat of violence to the person; (c) The de-
fendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many
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he determines death is appropriate, must state in a
written opinion that aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances.4 4 Finally, there
is an automatic right of appeal to the state su-
preme court as to both the conviction and the
sentence.4 Such an approach attempts to restrict
the amount of discretion in deciding between
death and a lesser punishment. Thus, reaction to
Furman in both the courts and the legislatures has
concentrated on the elimination or restriction of
the discretion within the capital sentencing process.
Validity of post-Furman Reactions
This legislative and judicial concern with the
existence of discretion in the procedures which lead
to the death penalty is well-founded. The argu-
ments of three of the majority justices rest in part
on the existence of discretion within the sentencing
process. justice White asserted that the death
penalty was excessive, since its deterrent and
retributive effect was greatly minimized by the in-
frequent utilization of the penalty.46 Discretion
contributes greatly to that infrequency. justice
Stewart noted that alternative penalties were
available for the capital crimes in the instant cases.
This indicated a legislative belief that capital
persons; (d) The capital felony was committed while
the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit any robbery, rape,
arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy or the un-
lawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb; (e) The capital felony was committed
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from custody; (f) The capital
felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (g) The capi-
tal felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any 'governmental function or the enforce-
ment of laws; (h) The capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel.
The mitigating circumstances are limited as follows:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity; (b) The capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance; (c) The victim was a
participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to
the act; (d) The defendant was an accomplice in the
capital felony committed by another person and his
participation was relatively minor; (e) The defendant
acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person; (f) The capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired; (g) The age of the defendant
at the time of the crime.




41 See note 14 supra. Justice Brennan also pointed
to the infrequency of executions as an indicator of con-
temporary disapproval of capital punishment.
punishment may be excessive even for capital
crimes 7 Finally, discretion allows the discrimina-
tory sentencing practices which justice Douglas
ruled violated the eighth amendment. 43
However, both remedies, the proposed manda-
tory death statutes and the Florida statute, rest on
an assumption that the discretion proscribed in
Furman is limited to the discretion of a judge or
jury to impose death or not. Discretion may exist
at other stages. The procedures of Texas and
Georgia, involved in the instant case, reveal dis-
cretion at other than the sentencing stage.
Besides providing for alternative lesser penalties
for capital crimes,49 Texas law allows the exercise of
discretion in its pardon and parole system. The
governor, with the signed majority recommenda-
tion of the Board of Pardons and Parole, can com-
mute the sentence or pardon a prisoner facing
death.50 Both parties then have absolute discretion
in determining whether to carry out the death
penalty. This discretion in sentencing and pardon-
ing is not necessarily subject to judicial review.
The Texas appellate court may not review the ap-
propriateness of a death sentence." The Texas
supreme court may review the sentence, but no
automatic right of appeal exists in capital cases.
In Georgia, the jury has the sole power to impose
death 2 or a lesser penalty." Both the governor and
the Board of Pardons and Parole have discretion
over the commutation of the death penalty."
There appears to be no automatic right of appeal
in capital cases.
Further, in many jurisdictions the prosecutor
may exercise his discretion prior to trial. The
prosecutor may decide not to bring charges under
the capital statute, but under a lesser-included
offense. Also, he may accept a guilty plea to a lesser
offense.
If Furman demands the elimination of all the
discretion within the criminal system, then both
the Florida law and the proposed mandatory death
statutes will not pass the scrutiny of the courts.
Both plans focus solely on the discretion in sentenc-
47 See note 16 supra.
4s See note 18 supra.
41 See note 15 supra.
50 Tmx. CODE Cm. Pnoc. AN-. art. 48.01 (1966).1 Id. at 42.04.
"GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-3201 (1971).
"See note 15 supra.
14 GA. CoDE Amx. § 27-2701 (1971). The Board can
commute the death sentence by unanimous vote only
if the governor agrees to suspend the sentence. The




ing, withouy dealing with any other inherent
discretionary power.
The Furman opinions suggest a primary concern
with the discretion of judge and jury to decide on
life or death. In defining the scope of his opinion,
Justice White spoke of a system which delegates to
judge and jury absolute discretion to impose
death."5 Justice Douglas criticized the system where
"the discretion of judges and juries in imposing
the death penalty enables the penalty to be se-
lectively applied .... " 51 Justice Brennan also
spoke of the discretion which abides in the judge
and jury!2 Similarly, the dissenters considered only
the discretion of the jury in determining sentence.
Chief Justice Burger stated that jury discretion
must be eliminated according to the majority
opinions.5 9
There is no indication in any opinion of concern
about other discretionary power over the execution
of the death sentence. No evidence is offered con-
cerning the abuse of such discretion or the harmful
consequences thereof. Nonetheless, the rationale
of the majority opinions could extend to all discre-
tion within the criminal process. Although such an
interpretation is possible, it is likely that the Court
will restrict any inquiry into future laws to their
effect on jury discretion in sentencing.
The various proposals for mandatory sentences6"
would completely eliminate the sentencing discre-
tion of the judge and jury. But the inquiry into the
validity of mandatory sentences does not end here.
Further investigation is required, to discern
whether the elimination of this discretion also
eliminates the reasons for which the majority de-
dared capital punishment to be cruel and unusual.
Clearly, the problems raised by Justices White and
Stewart are cured." Mandatory death sentences
would increase the number of capital offenders
executed. Therefore, it would no longer be valid to
argue that death is an excessive punishment be-
cause its infrequent imposition greatly reduces its
51408 U.S. at 314.
61 Id. at 255.
6 After referring to the ruling in McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) that juries may impose
death without guidelines of any kind, he stated: "In
other words, our procedures are not constructed to
guard against the totally capricious selection of crimi-
nals for the punishment of death." 408 U.S. at 295.
8 In rejecting the majority argument that dis-
criminatory imposition violates the eighth amendment,
Justice Powell limited his opinion to the discretion in-
herent in sentencing. Id. at 449.
D Id. at 397.60 See notes 39-41 supra.
61 See. notes 14 & 16 supra.
deterrent and retributive effects. Also, legislative
enactment of mandatory death statutes destroys
the argument of Justice Stewart, since it would in-
dicate a legislative decision that capital punish-
ment is not excessive for certain crimes.
Justice Douglas, however, criticized discretion
because it resulted in the discriminatory imposition
of capital punishment!12 Mandatory sentences may
not eliminate this problem. Douglas recognized
this by noting that a statute may be non-discrimi-
natory on its face, yet be applied in a discrim-
inatory manner." The mandatory sentence could
be restrictively applied to categories of crimes
which are committed primarily by minority groups.
Often the prosecutor can decide to charge the ac-
cused with a lesser, non-capital offense. Finally, the
jury may refuse to convict. 4 Although only Justice
Douglas ruled that discriminatory sentencing
violated the eighth amendment, the fact of dis-
cimination was referred to in other opinions." One
result of Furman is that discriminatory application
of death sentences may violate the eighth amend-
ment. Notwithstanding the statements of personal
distaste for mandatory sentences,"6 the Court will
approve them if not discriminatorily applied.
The Florida statute, and other similar propos-
als,17 may not be judicially approved. Besides the
greater risks of discriminatory imposition, the
Florida statute does not eliminate the problems
raised by Justices White and Stewart. The jury use
of standards to determine whether an accused
12 See note 18 supra.
61408 U.S. at 257.
1 The states and the federal government abandoned
earlier mandatory sentences because of jury nullifica-
tion. juries, faced with the prospect that conviction
meant death, often refused to convict. See McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-203 (1971).
"'justices Stewart and White referred to the phe-
nomenon of discriminatory application of the death
penalty. "Tihe petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence has
in fact been imposed. 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., con-
curring). "[Tlhere is no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring). But neither Justice based the constitu-
tionality question on this fact.
Both Justices Brennan and Marshall cited the fact
of arbitrary imposition to support their belief that
capital punishment is unconstitutional in all cases be-
cause it does not comport with the dignity of man. See
notes 7 & 11 supra.
Also, Justice Powell referred to the fact that the
sanction of death falls more heavily on the relatively
impoverished and underprivileged elements of society.
408 U.S. at 447.
66 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 408 U.S.
at 413 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67See note 44 supra.
19731
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should die may not increase the frequency of death
sufficiently to defeat the inference of Justice White
that the death penalty has only minimal deterrent
and retributive effect." Also, the legislative
authorization of restricted discretion indicates a
belief that capital punishment is not required for
all capital crimes.6 Statutes such as the one passed
in Florida may not restrict discretion sufficiently to
meet the requirements laid down in Furman.
7 0
Another hurdle such laws face is the Court ruling
in McGautha v. California:
In light of history, experience, and the present
limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite
impossible to say that committing to the untram-
meled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce
life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution.
7'
McGautha ruled that absolute jury discretion in
sentencing was not unconstitutional; Furman ruled
that jury discretion violated the eighth amend-
ment. Although Chief Justice Burger claimed that
McGautha was overruled, 2 it is possible to dis-
tinguish the two cases. The Furman decision did
not rule that the mere presence of discretion in the
jury violated the eighth amendment. Rather, dis-
cretion is unacceptable because it results in dis-
crimination and makes the death penalty excessive.
Furman proscribes discrimination and excessive
penalties, not discretion.
If McGautha is not overruled, does it prevent the
use of jury standards such as those contained in
the new Florida statute? The McGautha Court
cited several factors in upholding the constitution-
ality of jury discretion. The origin of jury discretion
was in response to the problem of jury nullification.
Faced with mandatory sentences, juries refused to
convict.73 A federal statute allowing jury discretion
6 See note 14 supra.
19 See note 16 supra.70 Neither the Florida statute nor the Model Penal
Code requires the jurors to follow these standards.
Florida provides no check to insure that jurors actually
used the standards in deciding whether to impose death
or not. The Code draftsmen intend the Code only to
help the jury in their determination.
71402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971). McGautha involved two
defendants, convicted of murder in California and Ohio,
and sentenced to death. Both states allowed the jury to
exercise absolute discretion as to whether the accused
should live or die. Petitioners claimed that to allow
such absolute discretion to impose or withhold death
violated fourteenth amendment due process require-
ments.
72 408 U.S. at 400.
72402 U.S. at 199.
was tacitly upheld in Winston v. United States. 4
In recent years, no court has upheld a constitu-
tional challenge against jury discretion. 75 Also, the
Court in McGautha stated that standards to aid
juries in determining the appropriate punishment
are impossible to fashion. Even the draftsmen of
the Model Penal Code agreed: "[Tihe factors which
determine whether the sentence of death is the
appropriate penalty in particular cases are too
complex to be compressed within the limits of a
simple formula .... "7 6 Other than the Court's
view that such standards are impossible to con-
struct, these factors do not prevent the use of such
standards if legislatively established.
But the McGautha opinion also cited language
from Witherspoon v. Illinois"' which emphasized
the duty of the jury to reflect public opinion.
The Court noted that one of the most important
functions any jury can perform in making a se-
lection is to maintain a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system-a link
without which the determination of punishment
could hardly reflect the evolving standards of
decency which mark the progress of a maturing
society7 8
If such language means that discretion can not be
taken from the jury then the Florida statute is un-
constitutional under McGautha.
Neither Witherspoon nor McGautha dealt with
the constitutionality of legislatively enacted stand-
ards. The former case was concerned with whether
the Illinois law effectively deprived the petitioner
of trial by jury. In order to determine the effect
of such a statute, it was necessary to define the
74 172 U.S. 303 (1899). The Court reversed a convic-
tion where the judge instructed the jury that a recom-
mendation of mercy could be made only if mitigating
circumstances were present. Such an instruction was
ruled improper in light of the discretion placed in the
jury by the federal statute in question.
" See, e.g., Sims v. Eyman, 405 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.
1969); Segeura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249 (10th Cir.
1968); In re Ernst, 294 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1961);
Florida ex rel. Thomas v. Culver, 253 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1958). Furthermore, no state courts have ever up-
held such a challenge.
76 408 U.S. at 205 (Justice Harlan quoting from Re-
ort 498, MODEL PENAL ConE § 201.6, comment 3, p.
1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)).
77391 U.S. 510. This case concerned the constitu-
tionality of the Illinois statute which allowed challenges
for cause in murder trials of any juror who has scruples
against or is opposed to capital punishment. The Court
ruled the statute violated the sixth and fourteenth
amendments.
78402 U.S. at 202 (Harlan citing Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. at 519).
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role of the jury. Naturally that role was defined in
terms of the prevailing practice of entrusting
jurors with the discretion to choose between life
and death.
Guided by neither rule nor standard, free to seled
or reject as it [see] fit, a jury that must choose
between life imprisonment and capital punishment
can do little more-and must do nothing less-
than express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death19
However, such a role was not mandated by the
Court.
Likewise in McGautla, the Court was not con-
cerned with the permissability of such standards,
but whether such standards were required. The
language quoted from Witherspoon supported the
claim that standards were not mandated, that
certain considerations counsel against fashioning a
judicial requirement of jury standards. Though
not constitutionally mandated, the legislative
adoption of standards, as in the Florida statute,
was not constitutionally proscribed. The Florida
statute, and others like it, should withstand con-
stitutional challenges brought under McGautha.
The enactment of mandatory sentences and
standards which significantly reduce jury discretion
can correct the immediate reasons cited by jus-
tices Stewart and White for declaring capital
punishment excessive. Yet, if death is excessive for
other reasons, capital punishment will still violate
the eighth amendment. Whether future death
statutes survive the test of excessiveness will de-
pend on the interpretation of excessiveness adopted
and the standard employed.
Historically, the Supreme Court has interpreted
excessiveness in several ways. One interpretation
was based on the reasoning that certain punish-
ments were disproportionate to the crime. Before
ruling that 15 years in chains at hard labor for
falsifying a public document was cruel and un-
usual, the Court in Weems v. United States spoke
of proportionality: "[Tihat imprisonment in the
State prison for a long term of years might be so
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment." 0 Both Trop v.
9 391 U.S. at 519. The Court ruled that jury, from
which all people with scruples against the death penalty
had been eliminated, could not perform that task.
80 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (McKenna citing Mc-
Donald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874
(1899). Later the Court stated "the provision [against
cruel and unusual punishment] was not obsolete ex-
Dulles and Robinson v. CaliforniaP held punish-
ments unconstitutional because they were dis-
proportionate to the crime. Although one dissenter
would limit this proportionality test to a case by
case investigation,8 the rationale of this approach
could make future death statutes unconstitutional
by demonstrating that capital punishment is dis-
proportionate for all crimes.
Another approach defined excessiveness in terms
of the severity of the punishment. In Wilkerson v.
Utah,84 the Court noted that punishments of tor-
ture, such as being beheaded and quartered, public
dissection, and burning, and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty violate the eighth
amendment. A later decision declared that burning
at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the
wheel, or the like was cruel and unusual.8s Despite
this early concern with physical pain, Trop v.
Dulles extended this test to include mental and
emotional pain. 6
Using this criteria, capital punishment may be
unconstitutional. justice Brennan concluded that
only the death penalty involves the conscious in-
fliction of physicalpain and suffering: "[I]t appears
that there is no method available that guarantees
immediate and painless death. He also noted the
mental and emotional pain an accused endures
while awaiting death."' Although the Court had
never ruled a punishment to be cruel and unusual
under all circumstances before Fuirman,.9 this ap-
cept as an admonition to the courts against the in-
fliction of punishments so severe as to not fit the
crime." Id. at 376 (McKenna citing Hobbs v. State,
133 Ind. 404, 32 N.E 1019 (1893).
81356 U.S. 86 (1958). In ruling that loss of citizenship
for a one day desertion during World War If was cruel
and unusual, the Court declared: "Fines, imprison-
ment, and even execution may be imposed depending
upon the enormity of the crime ...... "Id. at 100.
370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court held six months
imprisonment for the crime of addiction was cruel and
unusual.
81408 U.S. at 461. Justice Powell declared it impossi-
ble to find that capital punishment was disproportionate
in every case of rape.
8499 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). The Court ruled that
execution by shooting was not unnecessarily cruel. The
Court tacitly assumed the constitutionality of death
itself.85 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,446 (1890). The Court
held electrocution was not cruel and unusual, claiming
it was a more humane means of execution. Again the
permissibility of death was assumed.
86 356 U.S. at 102.
87 408 U.S. at 287.
81Id. at 288.89 This is due in part to the fact that legislatures have
repealed unnecessarily severe penalties in response to




proach does allow for a ruling that capital punish-
ment is unnecessarily severe in all cases.
Future statutes will also have to withstand con-
stitutional attack under the evolving standards of
decency test.9 ' A majority of the Furman Court ac-
cepted the validity of this test.91 Under this ap-
proach, if the public considers capital punishment
to be cruel and unusual, it violates the eighth
amendment. Two problems will plague advocates
attempting toprove that public opinion disapproves
of capital punishment: the type of evidence admis-
sible and the heavy burden of proof.
Earlier Supreme Court decisions employed ob-
jective criteria to determine the constitutionality of
capital punishment under the evolving standards
of decency test. Whether a punishment has been
traditionally imposed,92 is accepted in other juris-
dictions," or is comparable to punishments for
other similar crimes, 94 are indicators used to de-
termine the permissibility of a particular punish-
ment. Under such criteria, the death penalty does
not violate the eighth amendment.' 5
Similarly, Justice Brennan employed objective
analysis to determine whether the public approved
of the death penalty. He characterized the history
of capital punishment in the United States as filled
with continuing restrictions upon the use of the
death penalty.9" Today, juries rarely authorize
death.'7 From these factors, Brennan concluded
that society disapproves of the death penalty. But
"0 See note 5 supra.
9 Five of the Justices explicitly accepted the appro-
priateness of this test: 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Id. at 420 (Powell, J., dissenting); Id. at
410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 269 (Brennan,
3., concurring); Id. at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Since they were not dealing with the constitutionality
of capital punishment under all cases, Justices Douglas,
White, Stewart, and Rehnquist did not deal with this
question. However, Justice Douglas did concur with
the plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles which reaffirmed
this standard. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
"356 U.S. at 100. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1910), where shooting was ruled permissible after es-
tablishing its historical use.
93 In Trop v. Dulles, the plurality opinion noted that
only two countries still used loss of citizenship as a
criminal penalty. 356 U.S. at 101.
"In Weems v. United States, the court stated that
more serious penalties are not punished so severely. 217
U.S. at 380.
95 Capital punishment would pass two of these tests.
First, it has traditionally been imposed. Second, it is
employed in other jurisdictions.
"1408 U.S. at 297. Among these restrictions are the
changes in the method of executions to humane tech-
niques, the reduced number of crimes for which death
is available, and the elimination of mandatory death
sentences. Id. at 296-98.
7Id. at 299.
objective indicators of public opinion are not con-
clusive. Public opinion polls indicate at least
majority approval of capital punishment." Prior to
Furman, forty-one states had capital statutes.
Another problem with the Brennan approach is
the requirement of almost unanimous rejection of
capital punishment.9' Brennan himself reflects the
demand for unanimity when he characterizes exe-
cutions as a rarity today 00 No objective indicators
have yet demonstrated unanimous public disap-
proval.
Opponents of future capital statutes, which meet
the narrow requirements of Furman, must urge the
adoption of a standard of enlightened public
opinion. Robinson v. California has already sanc-
tioned the use of such a test. In ruling that six
months imprisonment for addiction to narcotics was
cruel and unusual, the Court stated:
But in light of contemporary human knowledge, a
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease
would doubtless be universally thought to be an inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.'0'
The opinion did not say society considered such a
punishment cruel and unusual. Rather, if the public
were fully informed, they would believe that penalty
violated the eighth amendment.
Justice Marshall also employed a similar stand-
ard in Furman: would the public, if fully informed
as to the purposes of the death penalty and its li-
abilities, find the penalty shocking, unjust and un-
acceptable?"°2 He concluded that if the public knew
of the discriminatory use of capital punishment,0 3
that innocent people had been executed,"°4 and the
deleterious effect a capital trial has on our criminal
system,' 0' they would disapprove of capital punish-
ment. The Marshall standard is, however, wholly
speculative. 0 '
"A 1969 poll indicated that 51% favored capital
punishment, with 40% opposed. This reflects a growth
in approval of the death penalty from 1966 when only
42% approved. Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punishment.
34 PuB. OPImON Q. Rav. 290 (1970). A 1972 California
poll indicated 66% favored capital punishment, with
only 24% opposed. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1972, at 67,
col. 3.
99 See note 22 supra.
00 408 U.S. at 299.
"'370 U.S. at 666.
02 408 U.S. at 361.
10" Id. at 364.
101 Id. at 366.
"05 Id. at 368.
100 The dissenters complained that Marshall's test
was too speculative, resulting in judicial legislation.
408 U.S. at 466 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Another measure of enlightened public opinion
is possible which would not be wholly speculative.
Public sentiment could be inferred from the de-
cisions of the jury in capital cases.1 7 Few capital
offenders are sentenced to death. If the majority
of Americans served witnessed a capital trial, they
too would reject capital punishment? °s
Without an enlightened standard, the eighth
amendment has no independent meaning. Reli-
ance on objective factors and a requirement of
unanimous condemnation make the amendment
only a rubber stamp approval of changes already
made. There is nothing in the constitutional de-
bates or in past decisions which requires the use of
such restrictive criteria. Although full weight must
be given any legislatively approved penalty,0 9
the eighth amendment has imposed an affirmative
duty on the Court to pass on the constitutionality
of punishment.
When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts
107 Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAmv. L. Rlv. 1773, 1783
(1970).
108 Id. at 1784.
109 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910).
with one of these provisions, we have no choice but
to enforce the paramount commands of the Consti-
tution. We are sworn to do no less. We cannot push
back the limits of the Constitution merely to ac-
comodate the challenged legislation. We must
apply those limits as the Constitution prescribes
them, bearing in mind both the broad scope of
legislative discretion and the ultimate responsibil-
ity of constitutional adjudication. We do well to
approach this task cautiously, as all our predeces-
sors have counseled. But the ordeal of judgement
can't be shirked."n
The study of jury verdicts to define public senti-
ment about capital punishment does not infringe
upon the legislative function. As suggested by
former justice Goldberg, public approval of death
may be dependent upon the concealment of the
truth about this penalty.". Only through the use
of a standard of enlightened public opinion can
public sentiment be validly judged. The use of this
standard would infuse the eighth amendment with
the vitality it was meant to possess. Judicial review
under the eighth amendment would once again
become a meaningful process.
"0 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
"I Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 109, at 1783.
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ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
In its recent decision in Argersinger v. Hamilin,'
the United States Supreme Court purported to
resolve part of the ambiguity surrounding the
right of indigents to appointed counsel that had
existed in the state courts ever since the landmark
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.2 Consistent with
its chain of recent decisions,3 the Court extended
the right to counsel to include misdemeanants.
It nevertheless failed to make the guarantee ab-
solute. In so doing, the Court may have pre-
cipitated more problems than it solved.
The basis for the right to counsel is found in the
sixth amendment to the Constitution.4 The lan-
guage of the sixth amendment can be interpreted
in a variety of ways: 1) as guaranteeing all accused
persons the right to employ counsel if they so
desire; 2) as guaranteeing all accused persons the
right to have the court assign counsel upon request
if the accused cannot afford to hire their own; and
3) requiring that counsel be assigned to anyone
without means to employ his own whether or not
requested by the accused.5 The first interpretation
seems clearly secured by the sixth amendment.6
It is the second and third which have caused dis-
agreement.
On the federal level, the issue has been resolved.
1407 U.S. 25 (1972).
2372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)
(probation revokee); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (suspect at an identification line-up); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (the juvenile); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (the "in-custody" sus-
pect); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sus-
pected offender); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) (the indicted suspect subject to surreptitious
interrogation).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for ob-
taining the witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact
on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal
Profession, 23 S.W.L.J. 488, 489 (1969).
6 "With us it is a universal principal of constitutional
law that the prisoner shall be allowed a defense by
counsel." 1 CooMY's CONST. Lim. 700 (8th ed. 1927).
"The right to counsel is permissive and conditional
upon the pleasure of the accused." Id. at n.2.
In 1938, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst,
7
guaranteed the right to counsel to all felony de-
fendants in the federal courts. In so doing, the
Court emphasized the fundamental nature of the
sixth amendment guarantee:
Since the sixth amendment constitutionally en-
titles one charged with crime to the assistance of
counsel, compliance with this constitutional man-
date is an essential prerequisite to a federal court's
authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty.8
Evans v. Rives,' a federal district court decision,
considered the question of whether this right was
to be limited to felony situations. In guaranteeing
a misdemeanant the right to counsel, the court
used strong language:
The purpose of the guarantee is to give assurance
against deprivation of life or liberty except strictly
according to the law .... And so far as the right to
assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitution
draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a
short period or a long one.' 0
In 1966, rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to guarantee the assign-
ment of counsel to any defendant without the
means to procure his own." One might argue
7304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8 Id. at 467. The court went on to say the following:
A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may
be lost in the course of the proceedings due to
failure to complete the court-as the Sixth
Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an
accused.... If this requirement of the Sixth
Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment
of conviction pronounced by a court without juris-
diction is void.
Id. at 468.
9 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See also Beck v.
Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969); James v. Head-
ley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969). In James, Judge
Wisdom felt the goal should be to "extend rather than
limit the right to counsel." He advocated appointing
counsel if an offense "may result in the loss of liberty
for any period of time." He also advocated appointment
whenever "moral turpitude" attaches to the offense,
and even to cases without any jail sentence or moral
turpitude where the issues so justify.
10 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
" FED. R. Came. P. 44. Pursuant to Act of June 29,
1940, c.445, 54 Stat. 688, the Supreme Court is author-
ized to appoint an advisory committee to make rules
of pleadings, practice, and procedure in the federal
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that the sixth amendment does not implicitly
guarantee the right to counsel in all cases, and
that the Congress has gone beyond what is re-
quired by the Constitution. The Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Rules 2 undermines this
argument. The Committee states that there is an
absolute right on the federal level of indigent
defendants to counsel. The Committee goes on to
state that the ". . . rule is a restatement of the
principles enumerated in [Supreme Court] cases."13
Congress appears to have gone no further than
to codify the rulings of the Supreme Court. Thus,
the right to counsel at the time of trial--a right
which on its face appears warranted by the sixth
amendment-has been secured on the federal
level.
The Supreme Court has hesitated, however, to
insure these same rights on the state level. While
professing its confidence that the nation's legal
resources are sufficient to supply all indigents
with legal aid, 4 the Court in Argersinger never-
theless hedged the issue. This result appears to be
a retreat from the position established in Powell v.
Alabama9 and Gideon v. Wainwright." In Powell,
the Court for the first time made the sixth amend-
ment applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment. 7 While restricting its decision to
capital cases, the Court frmly asserted the fun-
damental nature of the sixth amendment guar-
antee:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law .... He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guid-
courts. Those rules of which the Court approves become
law within 90 days unless there is adverse action by
Congress. Rule 44 reads as follows:
If the defendant appears in court without counsel,
the court shall advise him of his right to counsel
and assign counsel to represent him at every stage
of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed with-
out counsel or is unable to obtain counsel.
"Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, Id.
1Id. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, re-
hear. den., 315 U.S. 527 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
14 407 U.S. at 37 n.7.
15 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV:
"[NMor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him.
8
Unlike Powell, Gideon did not specifically restrict
its holding to the particular fact situation of the
case. In broad language, the Court held that the
sixth amendment guarantee was a fundamental
right required by the due process guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment. 9 Nevertheless, the deci-
sion was subsequently interpreted in a variety of
ways by the state courts.' The divisive issue was
Is 287 U.S. at 68-69.
19 In so deciding, the Court overruled the decision in
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Bells had concluded
that the appointment of counsel was not such a funda-
mental right essential to a fair trial as to require it be
made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth
amendment. The Gideon court, speaking through
Justice Black, felt that Betts was an anachronism. "[I]n
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, can-
not be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him." 287 U.S. at 344.
20 The Gideon decision did not dearly state whether
or not the guarantee to counsel for indigent defendants
was to cover all cases, or was to be restricted to the fact
situation in Gideon-a defendant accused of a felony.
As a result, the lower courts developed their own
criteria. Some courts did limit the right to those in-
dividuals charged with a felony. See, e.g., Cableton v.
State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967); State v.
Rockeymore, 253 La. 101, 216 So. 2d 828 (1968);
People v. Litterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 213 N.E.2d 670,
672, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (Ct. of App. 1965); Hendrix
v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, 256 P. 2d 696 (1969).
Others extended the right to counsel to include those
defendants charged with serious offenses. See, e.g.,
Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.Fla. 1967);
Burrazi v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P.2d 313
(1969); State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784
(1964); Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732,
216 N.E.2d 799 (1966); State v. McClain, 7 N.C. 477,
173 S.E.2d 53 (1970); State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165
S.E.2d 245 (1969); State v. Best, 5 N.C. App. 379, 168
S.E.2d 433 (1969); State ex. rd. Plutshack v. State
Dept. of Health and Social Service, 37 Wis. 2d 713,
155 N.W.2d 549 (1968).
Others granted the right where there was a potential
loss of liberty. See, e.g., In re Lopez, 2 Cal. 3d 141, 465
P.2d 257 (1970); In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398
P.2d 420 (1965); Ex parte Masching, 41 Cal. 2d 530,
261 P.2d 251 (1953)- People v. Mallory, 378 Mich.
538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967); State v. Borst, 278 Minn.
288, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Application of Stevenson,
254 Ore. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969).
Some courts talked about "special circumstances"
which warranted appointment. See, e.g., Arlo v. Heg-
strom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966).
Some gave the right to counsel in all cases. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. 1968); In re
Garafone, 80 N.J. Sup., 259, 193 A.2d 398 (1963).
See Dunaj, Will the Trumpet of Gideon Be Heard in
all the Halls of Justice?, 25 U. Mimw L. Rxv. 450 (1971);
Dyer, Gideon v. Wainwright: Echoes of the Trumpet,
36 Mo. L. Rv. 216 (1971); Laughlin, The Indigent
Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel: An Extension of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 18 DAxE L. Rxv. 109 (1968);
Poore, The Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v.
1973]
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whether the Gideon decision was to be restricted
to felony prosecutions-the fact situation in
Gideon--or interpreted as guaranteeing the right
to counsel to all indigents. Argersinger offered a
partial answer. The Court held that
[Aibsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no per-
son may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial.
21
The felony-misdemeanor, petty offense, and sim-
ilar categorical distinctions have fallen to a new
broad guarantee of the right to counsel in any
case where one's liberty is denied. It must be noted
that the criterion is not the possibility of im-
prisonment, but rather the actual imprisonment of
the individual.22 It should be noted also that the
guarantee only affects imprisonable offenses. In
light of the language in Powell, Gideon, Johnson,
and Evans, the decision of the Court to settle for
less than an absolute right to counsel is difficult to
justify. Rather than clarifying the decision in
Gideon, the Court has compounded the problem.
In many states a lawyer must be appointed in
all criminal cases regardless of whether a person
is accused of a felony or misdemeanor and regard-
less of whether his liberty is threatened.2 3 The sole
test is the indigency of the defendant. The Arger-
singer decision has no effect in these states, ex-
cept to insure that the right to counsel cannot be
taken away in most situations.N Other states
restrict the right to counsel to felonies25 or crimes
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv.
103 (1969); and Comment, Criminal Law-Indigent
Petty Offenders Accorded the Right to Counsel, 3 SETON
HALL. L. REV. 214 (1971).
21 407 U.S. at 37.
22 See Note, Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel, Mis-
demeanor Prosecutions: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), J. Cim. L., C. & P.S. 473, 476 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Arz. REv. STAT. Rules of Crim. Proc.
Rule 16(B) (Supp. 1972); CAL. PENAL CODE § 141
(West Supp. 1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-80
(1958); IDAHO CODE § 19-1512 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3 (1970); IowA CODE ANN. § 775.4
(1950); N.Y. CODE CluM. PRoC. § 188 (Supp. 1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-27 (1960); Osno REv. CODE
ANN. § 2941.50 (1972); OKLA. STAT. AM. tit. 22,
§ 462 (1969); TEx. Citm. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.04 (1966);
WAsH. REv. CODE ANm. § 10.40.030 (1962); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 183.1 (1957).
24 Under Argersinger, persons subject only to fines
conceivably could subsequently be denied lawyers in
these states.225See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3.160 (Supp. 1973);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3001 (Supp. 1968); HAWAI REv.
STAT. § 705-5 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4503
(Supp. 1972); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 29-1804.07 (1972);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-241.1 (Supp. 1966).
with labels such as "gross misdemeanors. '26 The
effect on these states may be substantial.
Under Argersinger no person can be sent to jail
who was not afforded the benefit of counsel at the
time of trial. This presents a trial judge in a state
where counsel need not be appointed in all cases
with a set of options: 1) he may appoint lawyers
in all cases; 2) he may designate those categories
of offenders to which he will assign counsel; or 3)
he may determine on a case by case method those
defendants for whom he will appoint counsel.
Should the judge decide to appoint counsel in
all cases, he will effectively avoid any problems of
due process or equal protection. Indigents will
receive the same opportunity to be represented
by counsel as defendants able to afford their own
lawyers. Furthermore, all indigents will be receiv-
ing the same treatment. The right to counsel, seen
as so essential to an adequate defense in Powell
and Gideon, will insure the indigents due process.
Appointment in all cases may be the only viable
alternative under the Argersinger decision. Given
the strong language in Gideon,27 it is uncertain
why the Court chose to make this result implicit
rather than explicit.
Should the trial judge decide not to appoint
counsel in every case, he opens the door to a host
of potential difficulties. Because no individual
may be imprisoned unless he is represented by
counsel at his trial, the judge will be faced with
the task 6f determining prior to trial the likelihood
that the defendant, if convicted, will be sent to
jail.2 As Justice Powell stated in his concurring
opinion in Argersinger:
26See, e.g., ALA. CODE fit. 15, §318 (1958); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 171.188 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-22-3 (1953); N.C. GEn. STAT. § 7A-451 (1969);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17.507 (1962); S.D. ComnnTPw LAWS
ANN. § 23-2-1 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-64-2
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5234, 5272
(1972).
27
The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some other countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
insure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law.
This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without
a lawyer.
372 U.S. at 344.21 justice Burger points out that it will be necessary
for the prosecutor to advise the judge of "any prior
record of the accused, including any use of violence,
the severity of harm to the victim, the impact on the
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The judge will therefore be forced to decide in ad-
vance of trial and without hearing the evidence
whether he will forego entirely his judicial discre-
tion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and
abandon his responsibility to consider the full range
of punishments established by the legislature. 29
In his determination as to whether counsel
should be appointed, the trial judge is, in effect,
determining sentence prior to trial. In so doing,
he must bring into play all the rules and protec-
tions inherent in the sentencing process. A failure
to do so may mean disregard for both statutory
and common law, as well as the fourteenth amend-
ment. Both the state's and the defendant's in-
terests could be compromised.
In most states the legislatures have specified
the forms of punishment for individual crimes,30
and discretion is often left to the judge to choose
among alternative dispositions.3' Should a judge
community, and other factors relevant to the sentencing
process." 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, J., concurring).
29 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
30 See Note, Statutory Structures for Sentacing Felons
to Prison, 60 CoLuSI. L. REv. 1134 (1960); text accom-
panying notes 19-29.
3 1 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 789.15 (1950); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.1077 (1958); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§§ 607:14, 607:14-a, 607:15; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10
(McKinney's 1972-73); OsJrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 991a (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 161.605-161.735
(1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-2 (1969); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.551-17.559 (1962). The new Illinois
law, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (1973), reads as
follows:
(a) Every person convicted of an offense shall
be sentenced as provided in this Section.
(b) When a defendant is found guilty by a jury
of a Class 1 felony which may be punishable by
death, the court may sentence the defendant to
death or to imprisonment. Where such recom-
mendation is not returned by the jury, the court
shall sentence the defendant under paragraph (d)
of this Section. Where the court finds a defendant
guilty of murder or of a Class 1 felony which may
be punishable by death, the court may sentence to
death or under paragraph (d) of this Section. No
one shall be sentenced to death unless convicted of
an offense which expressly provides that such of-
fender may be sentenced to death.
(c) In any case in which a sentence originally
imposed or recommended by a jury is vacated, the
case shall be remanded to the trial court. The
trial court shall hold a hearing under Section 5-4-1
which may include evidence of the defendant's life,
moral character and occupation during the time
since the original sentence was passed. The trial
court shall then impose sentence upon the de-
fendant. The court may impose any sentence which
the jury could have imposed or recommended at
the original trial subject to Section 5-5-4.
(d) When a defendant is convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor, the court may sentence such de-
fendant to:
(1) a period of probation or conditional dis-
adopt a policy of discretionary appointment of
counsel, he may be eliminating the possibility of
employing some of these options. The danger with
this procedure is that the judge will create arbitrary
categories-those for which sentences of im-
prisonment will be imposed and those for which
such sentences will not be imposed. The judge
would become a super-legislature. As justice
Powell points out:
[1In creating categories of offenses which by law
are imprisonable but for which he would not im-
pose jail sentences, a judge will be overruling de
facto the legislative range of punishment for the
particular offense.n
By setting up these categories, the judge will be
limiting the right to appointed counsel to certain
groups. On its face, such discrimination would
appear to violate the fourteenth amendment
guarantees of due process and equal protection 3
charge except in cases of murder, rape, armed
robbery, violation of Sections 401(1), 402(a),
405(a) or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Sub-
stances Act or violation of Section 9 of the
Cannabis Control Act:
(2) a term of periodic imprisonment;
(3) a term of imprisonment;
(4) a fine. However, a fine shall not be the sole
disposition in felony cases but may be imposed
in such cases only in addition to another disposi-
tion under paragraph (d) of this Section.
(e) When a defendant is convicted of a business
offense or a petty offense, the court may sentence
such defendant to:
(1) a period of conditional discharge;
(2) a fine.
(f) When a corporation or an unincorporated
association is convicted of an offense, the court
may sentence it to:
(1) a period of conditional discharge;
(2) a fine.
(g) In no case shall an offender be eligible for a
disposition of probation or conditional discharge
for a Class I felony committed while he was serving
a term of probation or conditional discharge for a
felony.
(h) This Article shall not deprive a court in
other proceedings to decree a forfeiture of property,
to suspend or cancel a license, to remove a person
from office, or to impose any other civil penalty.
" 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
3 The fourteenth amendment would seem to guaran-
tee that every defendant is entitled to have counsel
regardless of his alleged offense. Only in this way would
every defendant stand equally before the law. The range
of penalties for different offenses may well be the same.
While sentences within that range may vary from in-
dividual to individual without being discriminatory,
such is not true with respect to the insurance of pro-
cedural rights. The arbitrary denial of counsel to certain
categories of offenses is far different from an individ-
ualized sentencing procedure which metes out different
punishments within the same category.
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Language in earlier cases supports the conclusion
that counsel is necessary in all cases if the accused
is to obtain full protection of due process 4 Arger-
singer holds that at least in cases of actual im-
prisonment, it is necessary. An arbitrary classifi-
cation by a judge, however, denies persons in
certain classes the right to counsel. And, in fact,
Argersinger itself is an arbitrary classification. It
restricts appointed counsel to those misdemean-
ants the court has determined may be imprisoned.
Yet, persons not subject to imprisonment are
subject to other penalties. Failure to appoint a
lawyer for these persons may still be a denial of
due process.35 Furthermore, by limiting the right
31 See text accompanying notes 7-28 supra.
31 The argument has been made that deprivation of
property is no less a violation of due process than de-
privation of life or liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972). See also Dunaway, The
Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STA-. L. REv. 1270
(1966); Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection,
Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free
Access to the Courts, 56 IA. L. Rxv. 223 (1970); Com-
ment, Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1322 n.3 (1966); Comment, The Indigent's
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L. J. 545
(1966-67).
justice Powell points out that the majority suggested
no basis "for distinguishing between deprivations of
liberty and property." 407 U.S. at 51 (Powell, J., con-
curring). On the civil side, 28 U.S.C. 1915 gives the
trial judge discretion to appoint counsel for indigents.
Most cases, however, have involved requests by indi-
gent plaintiffs. The cause of indigent defendants seems
largely undealt with. Courts and commentators have
nevertheless discussed the necessity for counsel in civil
litigation. As one author said:
... the inability of the unskilled litigant to prepare
his pleadings, conduct adequate investigation,
familiarize himself with the rules of evidence, re-
search decisional law, or persuasively argue his
case seems no less debilitating in most civil litiga-
tion.
66 CoLum. L. REv. at 1331.
In Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1
(1964), the court noted:
[Clivil cases undoubtedly arise in which a depriva-
tion of 'property' causes consequences as grave as
a loss of liberty. The struggling employee, for ex-
ample, may well find a wage attachment or con-
fiscation of his tools as onerous in securing em-
ployment as a criminal conviction. Moreover, the
citizen who permanently loses his home, a govern-
ment job, a required license, or unemployment
benefits may, in many circumstances, receive a
more crippling blow than the criminal who receives
a jail sentence.
377 U.S. at 7.
Pointing to the fact that the right to counsel as se-
cured by the sixth amendment relates only to criminal
prosecutions, the judge in Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223
F. 833 (D. Mass. 1915), a deportation case, said:
... but it is equally true that that provision was
inserted in the Constitution because the assistance
of counsel was recognized as essential to any fair
trial of a case against a prisoner.
to counsel, Argersinger implies that the right to
counsel is a less fundamental right than other sixth
amendment guarantees. 6  Professor John M.
Junker has suggested that there is no basis for
such a distinction:
It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever
held, that the trial of a petty offense may be held
in secret, or without notice to the accused of the
charges, or that in such cases the defendant has no
right to confront his accusers or to compel the at-
tendance of witnesses on his own behalf.n
The right to counsel should not be permitted
to be made by a judge arbitrarily. As Junker, in
arguing for the creation of classes, admits:
The standard assumes that we know, or can dis-
cover those classes of misdemeanor offenses which,
although in law punishable by imprisonment, in
actuality never or rarely result in imprisonment ....
The imprisonable class standard is more easily de-
scribed than justified.n
Junker nevertheless argues that in certain
classes, such as traffic tickets, if it can be shown
that no one hires a lawyer even if he can afford it,
then a poor person is receiving equal protection.39
This makes two tenuous assumptions: 1) that
persons in a class such as traffic ticket holders
who can afford to do so never hire a lawyer, an
unlikely assumption; and 2) that indigents would
make the same choice. That persons who can
afford to do so do not hire a lawyer may mean
only that they do not feel it is worth the bother
and expense to exonerate themselves; they would
prefer to suffer whatever loss is involved. The
Id. at 838.
The relevance of discussing the right of indigent civil
litigants to appointed counsel is that here, as with many
criminal cases, only a deprivation of property may be
involved. If one cannot be deprived of property without
counsel in civil litigation, he should be entitled to the
same protection in criminal litigation.
New York is one of the few states where indigent
civil defendants are appointed counsel. See Brounsky v.
Brounsky, 308 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1970) and Hotel Martha
Washington Management Co. v. Siminich, 322 N.Y.S.
2d 139 (1971). In these cases, the defendant was given
a lawyer when in danger of losing property rights, in
one case alimony, in the other his domicile. A fine im-
posed upon an indigent is no less serious a deprivation.
Yet, Argersinger would not guarantee the defendant
counsel in such a case.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 4.
37 Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases,
43 WASH. L. Rxv. 685, 705 (1967).
Is Id. at 709.
39 Id. at 713.
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indigent may not be equally able to bear such a
loss. The result is unequal protection.
The fourteenth amendment problems are not
the only difficulties inherent in the creation of
categories. There is another. A judge is often
given wide discretion in imposing sentence.
40 It
would be unlikely that a legislature would ques-
tion the decision of a judge in imposing sentence
in a normal post-trial sentencing procedure. The
assumption is that a judge, having considered the
evidence as presented at trial, and the background
of the individual, is in the best position to deter-
mine proper sentence. However, where pretrial
categories are created, the judge is not in the same
position to consider all the facts as he would be
in a sentencing proceeding. The danger here is
that individuals will not be given individualized
treatment. 4t Courts have generally held that
punishment is supposed to fit not only the crime,
but also the criminal.42 By creating categories,
the court will immunize certain persons from im-
prisonment regardless of their past records, while
requiring others to face the full spectrum of pen-
alties. Aside from fourteenth amendment con-
siderations, 43 this result violates the long-estab-
lished interest of the state in seeing that certain
persons are imprisoned. Such interest is especially
evident in those states which have statutes re-
quiring a hearing to be held prior to sentencing to
consider evidence in mitigation and aggravation
of the offense. At least seven states presently have
such a requirement. 4 Strongest of these is the
Illinois law.45 As the commentary points out,
10 See note 32 supra.
"See AmmacAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON STANDARDs
FOR CR=IINAL JUSTICE-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROcEDURES, § 2.1(b), p. 13 (1967).
4See, e.g., Petersen v. Dunbar, 335 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1966); Abernathy v. People, 123 Ill. App. 2d 263,
259 N.E.2d 363 (1970). In Abernathy, the court held:
[The legislature of this State has provided that
when sentences are imposed by courts they should
be proportionate to the offense and should recog-
nize the philosophy of rehabilitation and should
not be arbitrary or oppressive.... Sentencing
must be tailored to fit the individual as well as the
offense.
123 Ill. App. 2d at 270, 259 N.E.2d at 368.
41 See notes 34 & 36 supra.
44 See, e.g., ARxz. REv. STAT. Rules of Crim. Proc.
336 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.780 (1964); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 10054-1 (1973); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 29-2217 (Supp. 1972); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.135
(1968); N.Y. CODE OF Cmm. PRoc. § 482 (McKinney's
1968); S.C. CoDE ANN. Circuit Court Rules 61 (1962);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-271 (1957). See also State v. Cup-
ples, 260 Iowa 1192, 152 N.W.2d 277 (1972).
45 (a) After a determination of guiltJ a hearing shall
be held to impose the sentence. At the hearing, the
"Section 1005-4-1 clears up any ambiguity in case
law and makes this hearing mandatory whether
requested by the defendant or not."46 No dis-
tinction is made between felons and misdemean-
ants. The obvious purpose of such statutes is to
insure a careful and just consideration of all factors
involved in sentencing.
47
Since the decision by a trial judge prior to trial
to appoint or not appoint counsel is the practical
equivalent of a sentencing, it follows that a
sentencing hearing must be held prior to trial to
determine whether counsel is to be appointed.
This procedure would protect the state's right to
ask for imprisonment should there be a conviction.
There is a very real danger here, should such in-
terest be ignored. It is quite likely that a defendant
charged with a crime and facing a possible jail
sentence and/or fine will view the prospect of a
fine with less trepidation than the possibility of
imprisonment. It is possible that he might prefer
to forego the appointment of a lawyer in return
for the assurance that he cannot be sent to jail.
This choice acquires added appeal in light of the
recent Supreme Court decision in Tate v. Short."
There the Court held that no indigent can be
sent to jail for failure to pay a fine. If he cannot
be sent to jail because no lawyer was appointed
and he has no money to pay a fine, the indigent
may escape any penalty. 0 This raises a serious
question of equal protection between indigents
and non-indigents. While the intent of Gideon and
Arsgersinger was to extend the benefit of sixth
amendment protection to more people, thus re-
moving another obstacle to the enjoyment of equal
protection, the result may actually be a reverse
court shall:
(1) consider the evidence, if any, received upon the
trial;
(2) consider any presentence reports;
(3) consider evidence and information offered by the
parties in aggravation and mitigation;
(4) hear arguments as to sentencing alternatives; and
(5) afford the defendant the opportunity to make a
statement in his own behalf.
ILL. R.v. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (1973).
16 Council Commentary, Illinois Unified Code of
Corrections, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (1973).47 See Aan RasAN BAR AssociATIoN ON STANDARDs
FOR CRIUMNAL JUSTICE-SENTENcinG ALTERNATIVES
AND PROcEDUREs § 5.1, (1967).
4While it is true that the amount of a fine, if any,
is still left up to the court, no imprisonment is possible.
49 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
50 One solution to this problem is the enactment of
statutes to permit time payments and garnishment of
wages. The court in Tate felt it was incumbent upon
the states to enact such statutes if there is to be an
equal administration of justice.
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discrimination. The non-indigent will be sub-
ject to the full range of punishment, whereas the
indigent may be subject to no penalty.
Though often overshadowed in the present-day
concern for the rights of the indigent, our society
too has a valid and important interest in the sen-
tencing process. The American Bar Association
recognized this interest in its approved draft of
sentencing procedure when it said:
The Advisory Committee holds no sympathy for
the offender who poses a significant public danger,
and is just as anxious as anyone else to get him off
the streets for a time sufficient to neutralize the
danger.51
In United States v. Chandler,52 the Court said:
The criminal law exists for the protection of society.
Without undue harm to the interests of the society
it protects ... [i]t can afford the ultimate isolation
from society of those individuals who have no ca-
pacity for the adjustments necessary to conform
their conduct as active members of a free society
to the requirements of the law.
53
A sentencing procedure has various objectives.
These include retribution, deterrence, restraint
and rehabilitation.5 The deterrence factor is the
one heavily emphasized by the courts. 5 Many
cases reflect the restraint aspect of imprisonment,
i.e., imprisonment for the benefit of the public. 6
A good illustration of this is the case of People v.
51 STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNA-
TIVES AND PRocEDuREs 1968, at 140.
52393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968).
5 Id. at 929.
','See State v. Holland, 103 Ariz. 250, 439 P.2d 821
(1968).
51 Strong wording in State v. Rinehart'125 N.W.2d
242 (1963) accentuates this point:
The Old Testament doctrine of 'an eye for an eye
and a tooth for a tooth' without doubt seems
harsh to the criminal, who prefers the modern
trend toward rehabilitation and 'the humanities'.
But the loser of the eye, or the tooth, may well
have a different viewpoint, and so should those
who have not yet lost any eyes, or teeth, or their
lives when they consider the purpose of law en-
forcement and the punishment of transgressors.
It is not so important that the particular offender
be punished, or that revenge be had, but that a
warning that crime has its penalties should be
given.
Id. at 247.
56See, e.g., State v. Randall, 21 Conn. Sup. 452,
159 A.2d 179 (1958); People v. Buell, 120 Ill. App. 2d
367, 256 N.E.2d 845 (1970); People v. Brown, 60 Ill.
App. 2d 447, 208 N.E.2d 629 (1965); State ex. rel. In-
diana State Bar Association v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21
(Ind. Sup. Ct. 1963); Louisiana v. Howard, 263 So. 2d
32 (La. 1972); State v. Gridley, 353 S.W.2d 705 (Mo.
Haynes. 57 The defendant was convicted of forging
a forty-five dollar check and was sentenced to five
to fourteen years in prison. He complained that
this sentence was too harsh. However, the record
showed that he had been convicted of eight prior
offenses within a twenty-two year period. The
court recognized the goal of rehabilitation, but
suggested that rehabilitation
presupposes the desire, the ability, and the willing-
ness of the offender to reform and to rehabilitate.
The record before us leaves a real cloud of doubt.
Society has tried. It would seem that the defendant
has not. Society is now entitled to some protection
without depriving the defendant of a reasonable
opportunity to rehabilitate and return to society if
he cares to do so.1 s
The public thus has a definite interest in seeing
that certain individuals are imprisoned. Haynes
accentuates the importance of having the judge
aware of a defendant's record prior to the deter-
mination of whether to appoint counsel. The
sentence in Haynes, if viewed alone, and not in
the context of the defendant's previous record,
was quite severe. Yet, in the face of all the facts,
the public interest demanded incarceration.
A failure to appoint counsel in all cases means
that the interest of the state in deterring and re-
straining criminals is subject to the discretion of the
trial judge in his pre-trial determination of whether
to appoint counsel. While it is true that a trial
judge often has the discretion to imprison a con-
victed defendant, such discretion is normally
exercised after the trial, with the judge in pos-
session of most of the relevant facts. Under Arger-
singer, a similar exercise of discretion may nec-
essarily be made before trial and likely without
background knowledge. As already pointed out,
the pre-sentence statutes refer to post-trial pro-
ceedings. However, if the state is to protect its
interest, and the sixth amendment is to be fully
implemented, then the equivalent of a pre-sen-
tencing hearing is essential at the pre-trial stage
as well.
In those states which presently have pre-sentenc-
ing statutes, such statutes may be applicable to a
pre-trial determination of whether to appoint
counsel. This result would follow because of the
Sup. Ct. 1962); People v. Burghardt, 233 N.Y.S.2d 60
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Potter v. State, 307 P.2d 551 (Okla.
Cir. Ct. 1957); State of Oregon v. Patzer, 493 P.2d
1389 (Or. App. 1972).
17 73 Ill. App.2d 85 (1966).
51 Id. at 89.
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nature of the pre-trial hearing, that of a construc-
tive imposition of sentence. Thus, in those states
which have a mandatory post-trial pre-sentence
hearing, it may be that such a hearing should be
held prior to the decision to appoint counsel. In
some states with a mandatory pre-sentence hearing,
appointment of counsel for indigents is required in
all cases. 9 In the other mandatory hearing states,
and in those states where the hearing is optional,"0
consideration of the above factors makes such a
hearing, in light of Argersinger, a practical neces-
sity. Those states which have only the option to
hold the hearing (usually at the insistance of either
party)"' should exercise the option to protect their
interests.
In those states without any statute relating to
sentencing hearings, and where counsel need not be
appointed in all cases, there is little other than
case law 2 to insure any protection of the state
interest. This situation presents an open invitation
to the state legislatures to require mandatory
pre-sentence hearings. The legislatures ought to
go further and specifically require a pre-trial
hearing to remove any cloud of doubt that such a
hearing must be held in determining whether to
appoint counsel.
Although the exact wording of the pre-sentence
statute varies, each requires that the court hear
all relevant information before passing sentence.
The question is "What is relevant information?"
Some of the statutes outline the appropriate
points.6 1 Case law further elaborates.
In State v. Quintana," an Arizona court held
6" These include Illinois, Arizona, Iowa, and Wy-
oming.
10See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1972);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1947); LA. CODE ClRz. PRoc.
AN. art. 875 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.20
(1969); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 95-1201, 95-2201
(1967); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:164-1, 164-2 (1937);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-26-17, 29-26-18 (1960); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.060 (1972); OK A. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 973-975.1 (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 137.080-
137.100 (1971); S.D. ComniLE LAws ANN. § 23-48-16
(1967); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-12 (1953).
6 1 An example is IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1947):
After a plea or verdict of guilty, where a discretion
is conferred upon the court as to the extent of the
punishment, the court, upon the oral suggestion of
either party that there are circumstances which
may be properly taken into view either in aggrava-
tion or mitigation of the punishment, may, in its
discretion, hear the same summarily, at a specified
time, and upon such notice to the adverse party
as it may direct.
"See note 57 supra.
63See laws for Illinois, Nebraska and Nevada, supra
note 45.
64 92 Ariz. 308, 376 P.2d 773 (1963).
that in determining sentence, the trial court is
not bound by the strict rules of evidence applying
in trials, since such a proceeding is not a trial in the
ordinary sense of the word, but it may consider
matters not admissible on the issue of guilt or in-
nocence.
65
What the court should consider is enumerated
by a Nebraska court in State v. Etchison:16
Factors meriting consideration are the family ties,
age, mentality, education, experience, and social
and cultural background of the convicted in-
dividual; his willingness to work at honest labor;
the motivation of the offense, and the amount of
violence, if any, involved; the frankness and will-
ingness of the defendant to cooperate; narcotic
addiction, if any; circumstances aggravating or
mitigating the offense; community attitudes to-
ward the offense; and the individual's potentialities
for recidivism. 7
In its Project on Minimum Standards for Crim-
inal Justice," the American Bar Association
points out the following:
Serious consequences turn on the correct resolution
of the sentencing decision, and it is sheer folly to
attempt such a hearing without more information
than is typically provided by the guilt-determining
process.69
The importance of this last statement is two-
fold, with one aspect diametrically opposed to
the other. On the one hand, it is implied that in-
formation brought out at a hearing held prior to
sentencing is more than just advisable: it is nec-
essary. Moreover, the relevant information must
extend beyond the fact-finding inquiry surround-
ing the event in question. It should, in addition,
give a total background picture of the defendant,
and should include any prior convictions and
arrests.70 In Illinois, for example, the pre-sentence
report for those accused of felonies must set forth
the history of the defendant with respect to "de-
linquency and criminality."'" This information,
under the pre-sentence hearing analogy, should
'5 id. at 775-76.
66 188 Neb. 134, 195 N.W.2d 498 (1972).
67 Id. at 501.
61 AmRICA BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINI-
mum STANDARDS ron CrnatAL JUsTICE (1967).
6
9 Id. at 101.
70 See AwERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
A PROCEDURES 201-204 (1967).71
LL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-2 (1973).
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be made available to the court prior to any decision
on the appointment of counsel. This brings us to
the other aspect of the problem. While such in-
formation is essential to a determination of whether
to appoint counsel, it may be highly prejudicial:
The disfavor for receiving proof of the character of
a person is strongly felt when the state seeks
to show that the accused is a bad man and
thus more likely to have committed the crime. The
long established rule, accordingly, forbids the pros-
ecution, unless and until the accused gives evi-
dence of his good character, to introduce initially
evidence of the bad character of the accused ...
The prosecution may not introduce evidence of
other criminal acts of the accused unless the evi-
dence is substantially relevant for some other pur-
pose than to show probability that he committed
the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal
character.n
Such evidence is not irrelevant, but in the setting
of a jury trial, is so prejudicial as to outweigh
the probative value. 3 The fear is that the jury
would place too much weight on these collateral
issues, and that the defendant would be forced
to defend all the alleged misdoings of his life.
Furthermore, there may also be a tendency of a
jury to convict not because the defendant is guilty
of the present offense, but because they might
feel he escaped punishment for other offenses.74
Consistent with this theory is rule 4-04(b) of
the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the federal
courts which permits evidence of prior crimes to
be admitted only in special circumstances.7 5 The
Advisory Committee's Note7 6 points out that no
mechanical solution is offered for the determina-
tion of undue prejudice, that the solution is to be
72 McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE
§ 157, at 327 (1954). The rule is firmly founded in most
jurisdictions. See J. VIGUORE, EVIDENCE §-194, at
641 (3rd ed. 1940).
73 McCoRmicK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVI-
DENCE, supra note 73.
7 Note, Admissability of Prior Crime: 1901-1951, 18
BROOKLYN L. REv. 80 (1951); Summers, Admissability
of Prior Criminal Acts as Substantive Evidence in Crimi-
nal Prosecutions, 36 TENN. L. REv. 515 (1969); 3.
WIGUORE, supra note 72, at 650.715 Rule 4-04(b) of the PROPOSED RuvLxs oF EvIDENCE
reads as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissable to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissable for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
76 Id. at 34.
made on a case by case basis by the judge. The
purpose is to exclude from the jury evidence which
could prejudicially affect its decision as to the
guilt or innocence of an individual.
There is no jury present when a court makes a
determination as to whether or not to appoint
counsel. This is generally done by the judge at
the preliminary hearing or arraignmentY7 Only
the judge will be aware of such information. If the
subsequent trial is by jury, the chances of any
prejudicial effect are remote. The jury will make
an independent determination of guilt based only
upon evidence brought out at the trial. The result
is not the same, however, in non-jury trials. Pro-
fessor Wigmore s notes that
the natural and inevitable tendency of the
tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give ex-
cessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus
exhibited, and either allow it to bear too strongly
on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as
justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of
the present charge7 9
If different judges preside at the hearing and
the trial, then the effect of the first judge having
heard the evidence of prior record reduces, but
does not eliminate, potential prejudice at the
trial. If one assumes that the first judge is not
basing his determination as to whether to appoint
counsel on the basis of categories of crime, 0 but
rather on information brought out at a pre-trial
sentencing hearing, and if counsel is appointed
only for those persons with substantial records,
the basis is laid for prejudice. A trial judge, know-
ing that only "criminal types" are being given
counsel, may be unfairly prejudiced.6 ' Certainly,
where the hearing and trial judges are the same
person, the inference is strong that the judge will
be unduly influenced. While perhaps less sus-
ceptible than a jury to influence by evidence of
prior convictions, a judge is nevertheless sus-
ceptible. In spite of all his training and experience,
he is still human, and subject to human frailties
in judgment.
The courts do not necessarily agree with this
position. Particularly on point is United States v.
7 See notes 24, 26, & 27 supra.7
8 J. WIGaosRE, supra note 72, at 646.7
9 Id. (emphasis added).
10 See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra.
81 It is conceivable that a jury may be equally aware
of this situation, but the unfamiliarity of the jurors
with criminal procedure makes this unlikely.
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Brooks.P The court held the following:
Our jurisprudence postulates the ability of judges
to dismiss from their minds, in reaching decisions,
offers of evidence excluded by rulings after hearing
arguments on admissibility of that evidence m
The court argued that such decisions were a com-
mon function of trial judges, and that to hold
otherwise would work an undue and unwarranted
burden on district courts, "especially in cases like
this, where the issue ... does not arise until after
the trial has commenced."u
It is one thing to attribute to the trial judge
the ability to discriminate in his own mind in-
admissible evidence which arises during the course
of the trial. It is quite another to allow the same
judge to hear prejudicial evidence brought out
prior to trial. In both cases, there is substantial
prejudice. In the first situation, the practicality of
trial without jury may necessitate such a rule.
No such necessity exists with respect to the second
case. In Bohacdef v. Wiscnsin,5 the court em-
phasized the goal of "reasonable dispatch" of
criminal cases86 This is no justification for un-
necessary prejudice. The Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of justice7 states that "speed is often
substituted for care.""u This is regrettable and
unnecessary. Different judges could be appointed
to hear evidence at pre-trial hearings to deter-
mine whether counsel is to be appointed. Because
of Argersinger, such an arrangement, whereby
special judges hear background information about
defendants, is imperative.
The defendant is entitled to protection from
unfair prejudice whether trial is by a jury or a
judge. Yet, under Argersinger, he may not receive
8 355 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1966). Defendant here was
convicted by a federal district court sitting without a
jury. The court first admitted into evidence a confession
obtained from the defendant, but later held it to beinad-
missible. Defendant argued that the judge, knowing the
substance of the confession, could not reasonably have
dismissed it from his mind in arriving at a judgement.
s Id. at 542.
81 Id.
85 50 Wis. 2d 698, 185 N.W.2d 339 (1971).
80 Id at 341.
87 PRESIDENTS'S CO snIoN ox LAW ENrORCEMENT
AwD A.DmsRATioi or JusTicx, THE CHALLENGE Or
CaMnE IN A FREE SocIETY 128 (1967).
8 Id.
it. It is difficult to reconcile a decision the result
of which implicitly requires a judge at the same
time to both consider and refuse to consider evi-
dence of an individual's background. Such a result
is absurd on its face. Faced with a contrariety of
demands, the judges may simply decide to ap-
point counsel in all cases. This is ai result that the
Supreme Court could have and Should have
achieved all along.
CONCLUSION
While indicating that the burden is on the
states to find ways to furnish indigents with
counsel,8 9 the Supreme Court failed in Argersinger
to take the last step to insure indigents the right
to counsel in all cases. By limiting its decision to
the facts of the case, the Court effectively hedged
the issue. Presumably, more indigent individuals
will receive the benefit of counsel, 0 but the dif-
ficulties in the mechanics of administration may
undo much of the good. If the trial judges adopt
the blanket rule of appointing lawyers in all cases
where the defendant proves he is an indigent,
then most of the problems discussed in this com-
ment will never materialize. There willbe b great
burden on the states to find the means to furnish
adequate representation, but the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of the right to counsel, and the
fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process
and equal protection will have been more per-
fectly met. As it stands now, Argersinger is a thorn
in the side of the sixth amendment. It may be that
the Supreme Court wished to extend Gideon
gradually in order to gauge the ramifications.
However, the cries that went up after the issuance
of the Gideon opinion for a clarification and ex-
tension of the principles stated are undoubtedly
going to be heard again.
89 "We do not sit as an ombudsman to direct state
courts how to manage their affairs, but only to make
clear the federal constitutional requirement." 407 U.S.
at 38.
90 But see an article by Gerald C. Moton, student at
the Northwestern University School of Law, in a forth-
coming study done by the LAW ENfORcEMENT STUDY
Gaoup. No attempt was made in this, comment to
actually study the extent to which judges'hold pre-trial
before deciding whether to appoint counsel. Moton's
article suggests that even where indigent defendants
are being sentenced to jail, in some cases no attorney
is present at the time of trial.
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THE APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEDURES TO ATTORNEYS
Recent decisions expanding the protections of
due process to attorneys' cited for contempt have
created friction between the attorney, who is
accorded these due process safeguards, and the
attorney's client, who is entitled to an impartial
and speedy trial.2 These decisions require that an
attorney charged with contumacious conduct be
given notice and hearing before an impartial
magistrate.
While these expansions of due process protection
may seem laudable initially, the effect of granting
greater protections to an attorney may prejudice
his client's sixth amendment rights. Courts have
paid scant attention to the attorney's client in
cases which have dealt with the lawyer's right to
be protected from summary contempt citations.3
Serious problems may arise from a failure to con-
sider the possible adverse effects on a client's rights
caused by awarding an attorney constitutional
safeguards. This comment will contain both a
critical analysis of cases which have broadened an
attorney's right to due process protections in
contempt proceedings and an examination of the
possible repercussions which the granting of pro-
tections have on the client's right to a fair and
impartial trial.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTEMPT POWER
Historically, courts viewed the power to sum-
marily punish contempt as inherent in all courts,
1 Hereinafter, reference to "attorneys" will mean
"defense attorneys in criminal proceedings."
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
3 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463
(1971); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 10 (1951);
In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1972).
A court summarily adjudicates contempt by wit-
nessing contumacious conduct in open court and then
punishing the contemnor without affording him due
process safeguards. A court may also punish contempt
in a non-summary, or plenary, manner. In a non-sum-
mary proceeding, a court punishes a contemnor after a
hearing in which the court provides the contemnor
with due procecs protections.
derived not from statute but from the nature of
the judicial function.4 The rationale which sup-
ported the summary contempt power was that a
court would be unable to preserve order in judicial
proceedings or to bring about the administration
of justice without the power to punish those who
declined to obey its rulings and orders.5
Blackstone's Commentaries6 is the primary
source for this view. Blackstone relied on a state-
ment of Mr. Justice Wilmot in The King v. Ahnon,
7
which asserted that the summary contempt power
had existed by "immemorial usage." Subsequent
courts seized upon this statement as support for
the summary exercise of the contempt power in
instances when contumacious conduct occurred
outside the court's presence. 8 While Blackstone
granted that the wide use of the contempt power
was a marked departure from normal common law
principles of due process, he found that it was
necessary to the very enforcement of laws, "for
laws without a competent authority to secure
their administration from disobedience and con-
tempt would be vain and nugatory." I According
to Blackstone, the common law concept of con-
tempt power permitted the immediate apprehen-
sion and imprisonment of those who acted con-
tumaciously, either within or outside the presence
of the court.
Twentieth century scholarship challenged the
historical validity of Blackstone's justification of
the contempt power when exercised against actions
committed outside of a court's presence. Sir John
Fox took exception to the view that a broad sum-
mary contempt power had existed from early
times.'0 Fox's inspection of the Rolls of the English
4 Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1923);
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324,326 (1903).
1 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888).
64 W. BLACKSTONE, COM NTARIES ON THE LAWS
oF ENGLAND* 282-88.
7The King v. Almon (1765) is an undelivered opinion
appearing in WiTmoT, NoTxs 243.
8 4 W. BLACxSTONE, supra note 6, at * 286-87.
9Id.
10 See Fox, The King v. Abnon, (pts. 1 & 2), 24 L.Q.
REv. 184, 266 (1908); Fox, The Summary Process to
Punish Contempt, (pts. 1 & 2), 25 L.Q. REv. 238, 354
(1909). For brief summaries of the conflict concerning
the foundation of the contempt power, see Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Frankfurter and Landis,
Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts
in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation
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Courts indicated that until the seventeenth or
early eighteenth century, apart from extraordinary
proceedings in the Court of the Star Chamber,
English courts neither had nor claimed broad
powers to summarily punish contempt committed
outside the court?' In disproving Blackstone's
assertion, Fox established that the summary con-
tempt power existed only when a party resisted a
lawful order of the court or when an officer of the
court behaved in a contumacious manner in the
court's presence."
With the common law foundations of the sum-
mary contempt power being questioned by modem
scholarship, courts were reminded that "the power
of a judge to inflict punishment for criminal con-
tempt by means of a summary proceeding stands
as an anomaly in the law." 13 The Supreme Court
embraced the revised position concerning the
summary contempt power in Bloom v. Illinois,4
where it established the right to trial by jury when
the sentence imposed for contempt would be longer
than six months. The Court recognized that the
power of courts to summarily punish serious con-
tempts must be balanced against the contemnor's
due process rights.
The Supreme Court has not been the only branch
of government to limit the exercise of the sum-
mary contempt power. Congress has gradually
limited the federal courts' authority to summarily
punish contempts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 pro-
vided that all federal courts had the power "to
punish... by fine or imprisonment, at the dis-
cretion of said courts, all contempts of authority
in any cause or hearing before same." 16 Not long
after its enactment, the Supreme Court viewed
this provision of the Judiciary Act as an exercise
of extreme legislative caution because it believed
that courts had an inherent right to punish con-
of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010, 1042-52 (1924);
Comment, Invoking Summary Criminal Contempt Pro-
cedures-Use or Abuse--United States v. Dellinger, 69
Micn. L. REv. 1549 (1971).
u Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt,
supra note 10, at 357-62.
12Id.
" Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting).
14391 U.S. 194 (1968).
15 Id. at 210-11. The Court provided:
[I]n terms of those considerations which make the
right to jury trial fundamental in criminal cases,
there is no substantive difference between serious
contempts and other serious crimes.
Id. at 202.
16 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
tempts which was in no way dependent upon
statutory authorization.
Congress soon became dissatisfied with the
federal courts' open-ended authority to deal with
contempts, an authority limited only by the type
of punishment which the courts could impose'
The incident which caused Congress to revise the
federal courts' power to punish contempt was the
disbarment and imprisonment of an attorney by a
federal district judge because the attorney had
published an article critical of one of the judge's
decisions.19 In the Act of 1831,20 Congress limited
the federal courts' power to summarily convict and
punish contempts to situations involving misbe-
havior in the presence of the court or so near the
court's presence as to obstruct justice; misbehavior
of court officers in their official transactions; and
disobedience to lawful court orders.Y The present
contempt statute" basically preserves to federal
courts the same authority to punish contempt as
was provided by earlier statutes.
Contempts are generally classified as either
criminal or civil, although some contumacious
acts may be considered to be both." In a criminal
contempt, the contempt sentence, which is usually
for a fixed period of time, is punishment for com-
pleted conduct. In a civil contempt, the court
imprisons the contemnor until he agrees to comply
with an order of the court. The Supreme Court, in
distinguishing civil and criminal contempt, an-
17 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 224, 227-
28 (1821).
sBloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1968).
19Congress instituted impeachment proceedings
against Judge Peck, the jurist involved, but it failed
by a single vote to remove him from the bench. A.
STANsBU'y, REPORT or T=E TRiAL or JAMr:s H. PEcx
(1833). See also Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication
in the United States, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 401, 423-30
(1928).
20 Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 98, 4 Stat. 487.
21 Supreme Court decisions recognized and supported
the limitations imposed by the Act of 1831. See, e.g.,
Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1941); In re
Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1889); Exparte Robinson,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1874).
2 Contempts, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970):
A court of the United States shall have power to
punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion,
such contempt of its authority, and none other as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence
or so near thereto as to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their
official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command.
13 See generally R. GoL.DPAR, THE CONTEMPT PowER
54--64 (1963); Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56
CoRN r L. REv. 183, 235-49 (1971).
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nounced the "punishment" test in Gompers v.
Buck Stove and Range Co.:2A
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its
character and purpose that often serve to distin-
guish between the two classes of cases. If it is for
civil contempt, the punishment is remedial, and for
the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for crimi-
nal contempt, the sentence is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court.2'
Direct and indirect contempts are also distin-
guishable. A direct contempt occurs so near the
presence of the court as to actually obstruct the
administration of justice.26 Indirect contempts
arise from conduct which obstructs justice but is
not committed in or near the court's presence.27
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure; states the procedures for the exercise of
- 221 U.S. 418 (1911). See McCrone v. United
States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1938), for further distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt.25 Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 441 (1911).26 
See, e.g., FED. R. CaPnx P. 42(a), which states that
only direct contempts, contumacious acts committed
in the presence of the court, may be punished sum-
marily.27 E.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). In
Nye, the conduct held to be an indirect contempt of
court was the exercise of undue influence by the con-
temnors, who forced the administrator of an estate to
terminate a wrongful death suit. The contempt was
indirect since it occurred one hundred miles from the
probate court. See also Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S.
385 (1957).
28 FED. R. Can. P. 42:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt
may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the
contempt and that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court. The order of contempt shall
recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge
and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A
criminal contempt except as provided in sub-
division (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on
notice. The notice shall state the time and place
of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the es-
sential facts constituting the criminal contempt
charged and describe it as such. The notice shall
be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the
United States attorney or of an attorney appointed
by the court for that purpose, by an order to show
cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is en-
titled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act
of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission
to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a
judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at
the trial er hearing except with the defendant's
consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court
shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
the contempt power in both summary and non-
summary proceedings. Summary disposition, as
contained in rule 42(a), permits the punishment of
contempt without due process safeguards when
the judge certifies that he witnessed the contu-
macious conduct. Non-summary disposition, as set
forth in rule 42(b), requires that due process pro-
tections, such as the right to notice of the charge
and a hearing, be provided an accused contemnor.
In addition, rule 42(b) requires that a judge who
becomes personally involved in an alleged con-
tumacious act cannot preside over the contempt
hearing. Recent contempt litigation has resulted
in an expansion of the application of rule 42(b)
procedures with a concomitant lessening of the
availability of rule 42(a) summary dispositions.
CoNTmnPTs By ATToRNEYs Am DuE PRocEss
The Supreme Court, in deciding cases which
involve contempts by attorneys or by those acting
pro se,29 has weighed competing considerations in
formulating principles which determine whether
summary or non-summary procedures should be
employed against a contumacious attorney. Cooke
v. United States"' was the first Supreme Court
decision to detail the factors which would permit
the summary punishment of an attorney cited for
contempt.
The threshold requirement which supported
summary disposition was that the contempt be
committed in the presence of the court.8 ' The
Court in Cooke believed that summary procedure
29 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971);
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Sacher
v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1951); Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517 (1924).
0267 U.S. 517 (1924).
8 1 d. at 535-37. In Cooke, the Court reversed an
attorney's contempt conviction. The attorney had sent
a contemptuous letter to a judge before whom the
attorney was handling a bankruptcy case. The judge
questioned the attorney about the letter in open court
before convicting and sentencing him. A unanimous
Supreme Court held that the summary procedures used
by the trial judge were improper because the lawyer
committed contempt outside the court's presence. Cf.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947), in which a judge
acting as a one-man grand jury pursuant to state law
convicted and sentenced for contempt a witness who
refused to testify. While agreeing that contempts
committed in open court might be punished summarily,
the Court asserted that summary procedures were
justified only when there existed an open threat to
orderly court proceedings. Since the contempt occurred
during a secret grand jury hearing, the Court reversed
the conviction based on the secret procedures of the
trial judge and remanded the case for a hearing with
due process guarantees.
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was proper in punishing open-court contempts
because, of the necessity to preserve order in the
courtroom. A second justification posited by the
Court was the absence of thd necessity for a hear-
ing. The Court believed a hearing would serve no
useful purpose because the trial judge personally
witnessed the contumacious act, thus obviating
the need of a second determination that the act
occurred n
The Court- also alluded to a circumstance which
might prevent the exercise of summary procedure.
That situation was personal criticism of the trial
judge by the contemnor.n The Court indicated
that a judge who interjected his personal feelings
into a contempt proceeding would destroy the
calm and considered adjudication of the con-
temnor's conduct which due process required.
M
However, Chief Justice Taft, the author of the
opinion, did not assert that an embroiled trial
judge could never punish contempt summarily,
but, instead, posited situations in which he need
not be disqualified. 5
The Supreme Court further developed the
rationale supporting the summary exercise of the
contempt power against attorneys in Sacker v.
United States,8 the first decision which considered
rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.P Affirming the contempt convictions of
the attorneys, the Court held that summary pro-
cedures exercised pursuant to rule 42(a) were pro-
per even though the trial judge issued the'con-
tempt citations after the trialn r:.
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, asserted
that the use of "summary" in rule 42 referred
to procedures to be employed by the magistrate
finding contempt, not to the timing of the cita-
tions. 9 He stated that delaying summary con-
tempt citations did not prejudice the contemnors
because the trial judge could have imposed cita-
32267 U.S. at 534-35.
Id. at 539.3 Id.
"Id. at 539. Chief justice Taft suggested that a
judge who was the object of contumacious conduct
could punish such conduct when substitution of another
judge was impractical and when delaying punishment
might injure a public or a private right. Cooke v.
United States.
H 343 U.S. 1 (1951). In Sacer, the judge imposed, at
the trial's conclusion, contempt convictions on the
attorneys who represented eleven Communist Party
leaders convicted of violating the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2385, 2387 (1970).
37 See note 28 supra.
33 343 U.S. at 11.
8I Id. at 9.
tions immediately after the commission of the
offenses. Furthermore, immediate citation of the
attorneys would prejudice the interests of their
clients.40
The Court also rejected the argument that the
nature of the criticism directed toward the bench
during the trial prejudiced the judge and dis-
qualified him from charging and sentencing the
contemnors. Justice Jackson indicated that rule
42(a) placed no such limitation on the use of
summary procedures. In addition, he argued that
since all contempts insult a court's authority, to
permit disqualification of a trial judge when a
contemnor insulted him would logically eliminate
the summary contempt power in all cases.
4'
By narrowly applying rule 42(a) to the facts in
Sacker, the Court rejected two of the three con-
siderations relating to the use of summary con-
tempt procedures explored in Cooke. The Court
held, in affirming the summary punishment of the
attorneys after the trial, that a judge could punish
contempt in a summary manner even though sum-
mary proceedings were unrelated to restoring
order in the courtroom. This holding disregarded
the language in Cooke which allowed summary
procedures only when there existed a need to
maintain order in the court.4 The Court in Sacker
refused to consider the embroilment of the trial
judge as a factor in its decision, although language
in Cooke suggested that a trial judge's conduct
might negate all justifications for summary pro-
cedures.4 The Court in Sacker did agree with one
40
To summon a lawyer before the bench and pro-
nounce him guilty of contempt is not unlikely to
prejudice his client. It might be done out of the
presence of the jury, but we have held that a con-
tempt judgment must be public. Only the naive
and inexperienced would assume that news of such
action will not reach the jurors. If the court were
required also then to pronounce sentence, a con-
struction quite as consistent with the text of the
Rule [42] as petitioners' present contention, it
would add to the prejudice. It might also have the
additional consequence of depriving defendant of
his counsel unless execution of prison sentence
were suspended or stayed as speedily as it had been
imposed. The procedure on which petitioners now
insist is just the procedure most likely to achieve
the only discernible purpose of the contemptuous
conduct. Had the trial judge here pursued that
course, they couldhave made a formidable assertion
that it was unfair to them or to their clients and
that a new trial was required on account of it.
Id. at 10.
41 d. at 12.
267 U.S. at 535-37.
OId. at 539; United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827,
835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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aspect of the Cooke decision: the Court found
that summary procedures were necessary in pre-
venting the waste of judicial resources with time
consuming hearings when the trial judge had
witnessed the contumacious conduct. 4"
In subsequent decisions,45 the Supreme Court
retreated from the implication in Sacker that due
process safeguards were unnecessary when con-
tempts were committed in open court, regardless
of whether pressures were brought to bear against
the trial judge's impartiality or whether there was
delay in the use of plenary procedures. The Court
in Offutt v. United States46 reviewed the conduct of
a judge who became embroiled in arguments with
an attorney during a trial and who, at the trial's
conclusion, summarily convicted the attorney for
contempt. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the ma-
jority, focused on language in Cooke which cau-
tioned that the power to punish contempt sum-
marily was "delicate" and that the contemnor must
be protected against the oppressive exercise of such
power.47 The active participation of the trial court
in arguments with the contemnor destroyed the
"atmosphere of authority" which should dominate
a criminal trial and rendered the judge incompetent
to make an objective finding of contempt. As a re-
sult, the embroilment of the trial judge required a
non-summary contempt proceeding before a neu-
tral judge 5
The Offutt decision overruled Sacker v. United
States sub silentio.49 The Court, in Offutt, adopted
the Cooke position that the personal involvement of
the trial judge in the contemnor's conduct was a
major consideration in determining the inapplica-
bility of summary procedures. 50 The Sacker deci-
sion had expressly rejected the embroilment argu-
ment on the ground that it would, as a practical
matter, destroy the summary contempt power.
The Court in Offutt also disregarded the waste of
resource rationale on which the Sacker decision
rested, thereby implying that the trial judge's con-
duct was the determinative factor which forbade
the use of summary procedures. 51
4343 U.S. at 9.5 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971);
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
46 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
47 Id. at 14.
"Id. at 17-18.
49 United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
10348 U.S. at 17; United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d
827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51 United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 837-38
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
In Mayberry v. Pemnsylvania 52 the Court clarified
the type of conduct which would disqualify a trial
judge and preclude the applicability of summary
procedures. In that case the judge, who was verb-
ally attacked, did not respond to the affronts di-
rected toward him as the judge in Offutt had.n Al-
though the judge in Mayberry failed to attain the
status of "active combatant," the Court reversed
the contempt conviction on due process grounds,M
finding that the attack on the integrity of the judge
carried potential for bias. 55 The delay in charging
the contempt and the presumption that the trial
judge had become embroiled necessitated the use
of non-summary procedures to support the con-
tempt sentence.
56
In addition to the delay in sentencing the con-
tempt, the Court offered two justifications for re-
quiring disqualification of the trial judge. The first
rationale involved an appraisal of human nature.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, presumed
that the defendant's outrageous conduct must have
an adverse effect on the judge's attitude toward
him, thereby poisoning the judge's ability to ad-
judicate the contempt charge impartially. A desire
to maintain public confidence in the trial system
supported the second justification for the Court's
holding. The Court believed that the public would
question the motivation of any judge who pun-
ished the contemnor who insulted him. In order
that the appearance of justice be served and that
public respect for the judicial system be main-
tained, personally insulting remarks would dis-
qualify a trial judge from conducting summary
contempt proceedings.5 7
Justice Douglas foresaw situations in which sum-
mary procedure would be proper. The trial judge
could have restored order in the court by citing
52 400 U.S. 455 (1971). In Mayberry, the defendant,
acting pro se, slandered and verbally abused the judge
throughout the trial. After the jury returned a verdict
of guilty, the judge summarily sentenced the defendant
for contempt. Although the judge did not become
actively involved in the defendant's contumacious
acts, the Court reversed the contempt conviction and
remanded the cause for a hearing before another judge.
3 Id. at 456-62.
4 Id. at 466. Mayberry also represents an expansion
of the ground on which a trial judge may be disqualified.
In Offutt, the Court reversed the contempt citation in
the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal
courts. The Court in Mayberry grounded its holding in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
6 400 U.S. at 465.
56 d. at 463-66.57 Id. at 465. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575
(1964), for an example of conduct which did not require
disqualification of the trial judge since it did not impugn
his integrity.
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Mayberry's contempts when they occurred. Doug-
las noted that Mayberry was acting pro se and
prejudicing no one but himself by his conduct.3
In addition, Justice Douglas suggested that the
summary punishment of attorneys might be neces-
sary in extreme situations and that "we do not say
that the more vicious the attack on the judge, the
less qualified he is to act. A judge cannot be driven
out of a case." 11 Thus, Offutt and Mayberry, ap-
plied together, restrict the exercise of the summary
contempt power to those extreme situations in
which attorneys' contempts are punished immedi-
ately after their occurrence and for the purpose of
restoring the order and authority of the court.
Two recent circuit court decisions, United States
v. Meyer60 and In re Dellinger,6" have attempted to
synthesize and apply the principles governing
criminal contempt procedure announced by the
Supreme Court. In both cases the courts reversed
summary contempt convictions because the trial
judges delayed charging the contemnors until after
the trials.62 The timing of the convictions demon-
strated that summary procedures were not em-
ployed to restore order to the courtrooms. The
court in Meyer found that, if immediate action be-
came necessary to restore the court's authority,
then summary procedures would be preferable to
53 400 U.S. at 463. A circuit court found that the test
of a trial judge's involvement announced in Mayberry,
although technically applicable to defendants acting
pro se, would also control contumacious acts of at-
torneys. The court adopted this view because the
Supreme Court relied on Cooke and Offiut in developing
the standard announced in Mayberry, United States
v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9 400 U.S. at 463.
60 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Meyer, the court,
at the trial's conclusion, summarily convicted and sen-
tenced an attorney representing anti-war advocates.
The attorney had stated in open court that the judge
had predetermined the defendants' guilt. The court of
appeals stated that since the trial judge failed to take
immediate action on the contempts, the maintenance
of order rationale for summary procedure did not exist.
The circuit court remanded the case for a rule 42(b)
hearing before an impartial judge because the attorney's
remarks involved personal criticism of the trial judge.
61461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972). In Dellinger, the
trial judge, at the trial's conclusion, summarily con-
victed and sentenced defense attorneys and defendants
for contempt. The court of appeals reversed the con-
victions and remanded the cases for a rule 42(b) hearing
before an impartial magistrate because the post-trial
convictions negated the waste of judicial resource
justification for summary procedures and because the
trial judge became personally involved in contumacious
conduct of the attorneys.
6 2United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 842-44
(D.C. Cir. 1972); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 393-95
(7th Cir. 1972).
wasting judicial resources by holding hearings on
the contempts.n
Having announced a rule which would permit
the mid-trial exercise of the summary contempt
procedure, the court in Meyer proceeded to create
a massive exception to its own holding. The court
stated that the presumption in favor of mid-trial
summary procedure might be rebutted by the ex-
istence of any of three circumstances6---the per-
sonal involvement of the trial judge in the contem-
nor's conduct, actions which would naturally de-
stroy the objectivity of an outwardly calm trial
judge, or the judge's adoption of an adversary
posture toward the contemnor.65 The embroilment
exception set forth in Meyer is so broad that its
application would limit the use of summary con-
tempt procedure only to disruptive conduct which
does not insult the trial judge.66 In light of the
concern for the absolute impartiality of the trial
judge expressed in Mayberry, it is difficult to
logically justify any use of summary procedure in
treating contempts. In any event, these decisions
indicate that rule 42(b) safeguards must be pro-
vided to attorneys charged with contempt except
in extreme circumstances.
CoN.TnAcious ATroiRNY Vs. CLiENT-
WHosE RIGHTS PREDOMNATE?
The Supreme Court confronted a serious due
process issue in defining the situations in which at-
63 462 F.2d at 842.
64 1Id.65 Id. The third circumstance is similar to the first.
A judge who adopts the role of adversary negates the
possibility that due process will govern the sentencing
of the contemnor. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955),
and Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971), illus-
trate this situation. In Murchisrm, the judge, acting as
a one-man grand jury pursuant to state law, convicted
the defendant for contempt which arose from testi-
mony given during secret grand jury proceedings. The
Court reversed and remanded the case for a public
hearing before a different judge, holding that the
judge's role as an adversary in the grand jury proceeding
created too great a risk that the judge would fail to
view the contumacious conduct in a detached manner.
In Johnson, the Court required reversal when a judge,
who had been a losing party in a civil rights suit filed
against him by the defendant, summarily punished the
defendant for contempt long after the alleged con-
tumacious conduct. The Supreme Court found that the
adverse ruling in the civil rights suit caused the judge
to view the defendant with prejudice.6 6Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463
(1971); United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 843
(D.C. Cir. 1972). See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575
(1964). But see Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12
(1951), where the Court stated that any contempt
committed in the presence of the court is an offense
against the judge's dignity and authority.
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torneys would be entitled to plenary hearings be-
fore impartial judges. The Court was forced to
balance two policy rationales and to determine
which better promoted the administration of
justice.
One of the policy arguments favored the pres-
ervation of judicial authority to summarily pun-
ish contempts by means of rule 42(a) procedures,
a position which found support in the Sacker deci-
sion. The basic argument for this policy is that the
judiciary must be equipped to enforce its orders
and rulings expeditiously if it is to function in a
viable manner.,
The counter-rationale, that the contempt power
is an "anomaly" in the law, is set forth in Justice
Black's dissent in Green v. United StatesY' He ar-
gued that the summary contempt power allowed
the trial judge "to lay down the law, to prosecute
those who he believes have violated his command
(as interpreted by him), to sit in 'judgment' on his
own charges and then within the broadest kinds of
bounds to punish it as he sees fit." 11 For Justice
Black, the summary contempt power was incon-
sistent with rudimentary principles of criminal
justice because it allowed "the possibility of irre-
sponsible official action" contrary to the intent of
the Bill of Rights. In conclusion, justice Black ar-
gued that contempt defendants, in all cases, be
extended all the procedural safeguards guaranteed
by the Constitution.
70
The thrust of the Supreme Court cases would
seem to support the proposition that a contuma-
cious attorney, whose conduct is neither cited im-
mediately nor extremely insulting to the trial judge,
must be provided due process protections in a non-
67Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949); Ex Parte
Terry, 128 U.S. 288 (1888).
356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
Many commentators support the extension of due
process protections to defendants summarily cited for
contempt. See R. GoxanrA.E, supra note 23, at 262-64;
Comment, supra note 10, at 1563-69; Comment, Sum-
mary Punishment for Contempt: Suggestion that Due
Process Requires Notice and Hearing Before Independent
Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 463 (1966); Comment,
Conduct of Attorney During Course of Trial, 71 Wis. L.
REv. 329 (1971).
6' 356 U.S. at 198 (1956); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136-37 (1955).
70 In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the
Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of Justice Black
in requiring trial by jury for all contempts punishable
by imprisonment for more than six months. The Court
held that, since a contemnor was susceptible to serious
criminal penalties, contempts must be considered seri-
ous crimes. As a result, the Court refused to balance a
contempt defendant's procedural rights against the
desire for dispatch and efficiency in judicial enforce-
ment of contempt charges.
summary proceeding. Two questions emerge from
acceptance of this proposition. What due process
protections should be extended to a contumacious
attorney? At what juncture of the trial should a
plenary hearing be held?
Although recent decisions7' indicate that con-
tempts by attorneys should, in nearly all cases, be
adjudicated in a plenary proceeding pursuant to
rule 42(b), the Supreme Court has not conclusively
specified the exact nature of due process protec-
tions with which a contumacious attorney must be
provided.72 In a recent opinion, United States v.
Seale71 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit required that the following due process pro-
tections be made available to the defendant in a
plenary proceeding: a public hearing after adequate
notice of the charge, the assistance of counsel, the
presumption of innocence, proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the right to compulsory process,
and the right to testify. 4
While the reviewing courts have expanded due
process protections for attorneys in contempt cases,
they have neglected to thoroughly consider the ef-
fect of rule 42(b) procedures on the attorneys'
clients. The interests of both the attorney and his
client should be considered in determining the ap-
propriate time for a plenary hearing.
From the attorney's viewpoint, the best time for
a plenary contempt hearing would be as soon after
the contempt citation as the attorney could prop-
erly prepare his defense. There are two reasons
which support an immediate hearing to determine
whether the attorney actually committed con-
tempt. First, a prompt hearing informs the attor-
ney whether he exceeded the bounds of legal ad-
vocacy and, if so, provides him with a guide to
avoid future criminal conduct. Second, an immedi-
ate hearing, in which the attorney's doubts as to
what conduct constitutes contempt are resolved,
enables the attorney to represent his client without
concern about criminal contempt citations. With-
out an immediate hearing, the lawyer attempts to
advocate his client's cause under either a contempt
71 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971);
United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir 1972);
In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
72
FEn. R. CR-i. P. 42(b), supra note 28, contains
the minimum due process safeguards. See also May-
berry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1924).
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
74 id. at 372-73.
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citation of uncertain validity or the chilling threat
of future contempt charges.75
The client's right to the effective assistance of
counsel is an important factor in determining the
point in the trial for a rule 42(b) hearing. The at-
torney is duty-bound to provide effective advocacy
for his client. As a result, there is often conflict in
the courtroom arising from the desire of the attor-
ney to be an aggressive and effective advocate of
his client's cause and the desire of the court to
maintain orderly control of the proceedings. It is
often difficult to determine the point at which the
the attorney crosses the line between advocate and
contemnor. Therefore, a prompt hearing preserves
the client's right to have the effective assistance of
counsel rather than the assistance of counsel whose
representation is chilled by the fear of a contempt
citation.
There is no doubt that an attorney must be al-
lowed some leeway in pressing the claims of his
client. As the Supreme Court stated in In re
McConnell,"
It is also essential to a fair administration of
justice that lawyers be able to make honest, good-
faith efforts to present their clients' cases.... The
arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client's
case strenuously and persistently cannot amount
to contempt so long as the lawyer does not in some
way create an obstruction which blocks the judge
in the performance of his judicial duty.79
For that reason, reviewing courts carefully scruti-
nize contempt citations against attorneys to "insure
that trial judges (or the jury on remand) are not
left free to manipulate the balance between vig-
76 United States v. Kelley, 314 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.
1963). In Keley, the court reversed defendant's con-
viction because the trial judge threatened the defend-
ant's lawyer with contempt in the jury's presence. The
court stated, "The threat of contempt not only tended
to belittle the lawyer in the eyes of jury, but also to
unnerve him and throw him off balance so that he could
not devote his best talents to the defense of his client."
314 F.2d at 463. See also Washington v. Collins, 66
Wash. 2d 71, 400 P.2d 793 (1965).
70 It is settled that "effective assistance of counsel"
is a right of constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Cole-
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Bastida v.
Braniff, 444 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1971).
7 ABA CODE Or PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsiBlxfY,
CANON 7: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law."
76370 U.S. 230 (1962).79 Id. at 236.
orous advocacy and obstructions so as to chill ef-
fective advocacy." 80
Magistrates conducting hearings on contuma-
cious conduct in federal courts must make findings
of a defendant's misbehavior, obstruction of justice,
obstruction in the court's presence, and intent 1
Of the four elements, only obstruction in the court's
presence is susceptible to a simple interpretation.
The Supreme Court in Sacker v. United Statess.
announced a general rule defining a line beyond
which advocacy becomes contumacious misbe-
havior. That standard states that a lawyer may
press his client's position until the court issues a
ruling, at which time an attorney's only recourse
becomes an appeal. 3 In many instances, trial
courts issue contempt citations when an attorney
continues arguments on rulings after the court has
instructed the attorney to cease. However, the at-
torney must be afforded a sufficient opportunity to
argue his client's position before the court makes a
decision." Trial judges should not be too hasty in
issuing rulings prior to the full presentation of an
attorney's argument. Granting an attorney ade-
quate opportunity to argue his position will pre-
sumably prompt the trial judge to fairly weigh
the issues, often preventing error from infecting
the record66
A second element necessary to support a finding
of contempt by an attorney is obstruction of justice.
Not every insult directed toward the bench will
support a finding of contempt since judges are as-
sumed to be hardy individuals 6 who can absorb a
certain amount of abuse. Conduct which merely di-
verts a judge's attention from the bench will not
support a contempt citation; there must be a ma-
terial obstruction of justice.8 Obstruction may oc-
80 In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 94 (6th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966).
81 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367 (7th Cir.
1972). The four elements are contained in the statute
defining contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
'343 U.S. 1 (1951).
83 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1951);
Macnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 160 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952); Hallinan v.
United States, 182 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951).
'"In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972);
Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 359 P.2d
274 (1961).
86 In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 1972).
68 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
87 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958);
United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 369 (7th Cir.
1972). See Dobbs, supra note 23, at 208.
The Supreme Court dealt with the line between mere
insult and obstruction in In re Little, 404 U.S. 553
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cur if an attorney makes a remark in an insulting
manner or if arguments by counsel cause significant
delay. In any case, a court may cite contempt by
an attorney only on "a showing of imminent preju-
dice to a fair and dispassionate proceeding." 83
Intent is the third troublesome element in de-
termining contempt. While courts will grant an
attorney great latitude in advocating his client's
cause, good faith is not an absolute defense to con-
tempt.89 As the court stated,
Given this extreme liberality necessary to a vital
bar and thus the effective discovery of truth
through the adversary process, an attorney pos-
sesses the requisite intent only if he knows or rea-
sonably should be aware, in view of all the circum-
stances, especially in the heat of controversy,
that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his
proper role and hindering rather than facilitating
the search for truth."
When an attorney may be uncertain as to whether
his conduct exceeds the bounds of proper advocacy,
the court should warn the attorney that his conduct
is bordering on contempt.91 In that way, the ele-
ment of intent becomes inoperative since the at-
torney has been informed that if he pursues a
certain line of argument, a contempt citation will
result. In sum, the dangers involved in walking the
tightrope between contempt and advocacy would
seem to require a plenary hearing of some complex-
ity in order to assure that an attorney is not un-
justifiably punished and his client is not unconsti-
tutionally deprived of effective advocacy by hasty
summary proceedings.
While a mid-trial continuance for a non-sum-
mary hearing may benefit the attorney's client to
the extent that aggressive and effective assistance
of counsel might be preserved, that benefit may be
(1972). In Little, the defendant, appearing pro se, al-
leged in his summation to the jury, that the trial judge
had prejudiced his trial. The Court reversed the con-
tempt citation, holding that trial judges must not con-
fuse their feelings with obstructions of justice. This
holding indicates that the Court has set a high threshold
for determining obstructions of justice.
"1 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 370 (7th
Cir. 1972).
"I1n re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 397-98 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 362 (7th
Cir. 1972).
90 In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
91 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1951); Fisher v. Pace, 336
U.S. 155 (1949). Warning or citing an attorney for
contempt should occur outside the presence of the jury
because the possibility is great that the jury may be
prejudiced against the contumacious attorney's client.
outweighed by the delay in the client's own trial.
A lengthy delay might be prejudicial, possibly vio-
lating the client's right to a speedy trial. 2 The
right to a speedy trial is, at present, not defined
with regard to mid-trial continuances. 93
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Dickey
v. Florida4 suggests some general standards by
which the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial
might be reviewed. He suggested that any delay not
caused by the defendant but by the actions of a
governmental authority might prejudice a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right. 9" Conceivably,
one could argue that a judge who harasses an at-
torney with unsupported contempt charges, which
cause the interruption of the principal trial for a
rule 42(b) hearing, might violate the defendant's
right to a fair and speedy trial. The violation might
arise by the loss of favorable witnesses or by the
jury's impatience with the delay.
It is extremely difficult to establish proof of a
prejudicial attitude adopted by either the jury or
by witnesses as a result of the delay. However,
Justice Brennan suggests that,
Within the context of Sixth Amendment rights,
the defendant generally does not have to show that
he was prejudiced by the denial of jury, knowledge
of the charges against him, trial in the district
where the crime was committed, or compulsory
process. Because potential substantial prejudice
inheres in the denial of any of these safeguards,
prejudice is usually assumed when any of them is
shown to be denied. Because concrete evidence that
their denial caused the defendant substantial pre-
judice is often unavailable, predjudice must be
assumed, or constitutional rights will be denied
without remedy.... When the Sixth Amend-
ment right to speedy trial is at stake, it may be
equally realistic and necessary to assume prejudice
once the accused shows that he was denied a rapid
prosecution."
Despite Justice Brennan's suggestion that proof
of prejudice may not be necessary to show a denial
or infringement of this sixth amendment right,
there is no case law concerning mid-trial continu-
ances which violate the right to a speedy trial.
92 U.S. CONST., amend. VI (quoted supra note 2). See
generally Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
93 Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 44 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
9" Id. at 39.
95 Id. at 51.
96 Id. at 54-55.
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CONCLUSION
Although the thrust of this comment supports
the elimination of summary contempt procedures,
the possible prejudice to the defendant caused by
interrupting his trial for a plenary contempt hear-
ing is a factor which should be weighed in favor of
employing summary contempt proceedings against
the defendant's attorney. Summary procedure
would insure the effective assistance of counsel by
the trial court's swift definition of contumacious
conduct. Summary proceedings held outside the
jury's presence should cause no significant delay in
the primary trial. Also, the summary adjudication
of an attorney's contempt would restore order to
the courtroom, provided that the citation is issued
when the contumacious conduct occurs.
Although the possibility of a prejudicial delay in
the defendant's trial would seem to be a new justi-
fication for the use of summary contempt proceed-
ings against an attorney, the defendant's right to
the effective assistance of counsel is not impaired
by an immediate plenary proceeding to review an
attorney's conduct. Moreover, as previously sug-
gested, this particular sixth amendment right
would require an immediate hearing. The relation-
ship of mid-trial continuances to the denial of a
speedy trial under the sixth amendment is as yet
undefined. 9:However, both an attorney facing a
contempt charge and his client desire that the as-
sistance of counsel be effective. Because courts have
judged the assistance of counsel to be a right
worthy of scrupulous protection," the use of mid-
trial rule 42(b) hearings will best give effect to the
due process rights of both attorney and client.
7 Id. at 40.
18 See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932); Bastida v. Braniff, 444 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1971).
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